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ABSTRACT
MORAL IMAGINATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
by
Peter L. Samuelson
A review of the literature in several domains reveals that moral imagination plays
a role in how we deliberate about moral issues and what motivates us to act in a moral
way. This study begins by outlining an operational definition of moral imagination based
largely on Dewey’s model of dramatic rehearsal (Dewey, 1922), along with an
explication of the role of image schemas, metaphor, empathy, and narrative in moral
imagination (Johnson, 1993) and an examination of how moral imagination develops
through the lifespan. A review of the research of the components of moral imagination is
included, especially in the literature of moral development, problem solving, and
creativity, as well as a proposal of an avenue of research to advance the understanding of
this vital and complex human capacity. The study continues with an investigation of a
curriculum designed to foster the cognitive processing of empathic emotions stimulated
by viewing film clips from Hollywood-produced films. The curriculum stimulates moral
imagination by offering situations in which participants can place themselves and then
discuss possible moral outcomes. The curriculum is thought to aid in the development of
moral expertise by exposing participants to a perspective-taking script from childhood
(Hoffman, 2000) and making that script chronically accessible to the participant (Lapsley
& Narvaez, in press). Three hundred sixty-six students (grades third through eighth)
enrolled in after-school programs in two rural Georgia counties were randomly assigned

to either an intervention or control group. The content of the intervention was delivered
in a 3-week period in one county and in a 9-week period in the other. Results indicate
that the longer intervention produced more gains in moral theme recognition (MTI;
Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999) compared to the shorter intervention.
Participants in the shorter intervention demonstrated an attraction to moral theme
statements reflecting higher stages of moral reasoning after the intervention than before
compared to a control group from the same county. While further study is warranted, it
appears the curriculum initiated a transition to higher stage reasoning in some of the
participants.
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CHAPTER 1
CONCIEVING MORAL IMAGINATION: ITS DEFINITION AND ASSESSEMENT
Introduction
“Imagination is the chief instrument of the good” (Dewey quoting Shelley, 1934/1980).
The idea of moral imagination has within it an inherent definitional tension--a
paradox. For where the moral has to do with the common good, imagination strives for
the uncommon. Where the moral has to do with societal relations, imagination is
inherently individualistic. Where the moral is based on laws and conventions, the
conventional is the very antithesis of the imaginative (Runco, 1993). For example,
Kohlberg’s famous moral development theory defines morality in terms of
conventionality, parsing moral reasoning into pre-conventional, conventional, and postconventional stages (Kohlberg, 1981). Yet, in spite of these tensions, many moral and
educational philosophers of the past century (Bruner,1986; Dewey; 1934/1980;
Egan,1997; Fesmire,1994; Greene,1995; Haste,1993; Johnson,1993; Kekes,1995; Lakoff
& Johnson,1999; Tivnan,1995; Vygostky cited in Ayman-Nolley,1992; Zaw,1996) as
well as numerous psychologist (Gruber,1993; Kudriavtsev, 2001; Modell, 2003;
Mouchiroud & Lubart, T., 2002; Paradales, 2002; Runco, 2003) consider imagination to
be an integral part of moral deliberation and moral action. Many of them see limitations
in the conventional approach to morality and ethics with its focus on rights and duties,
1
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and look to imagination to help us solve our most pressing and vexing moral problems
(for a thorough discussion see Fesmire, 1994; Johnson, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
This paper is an investigation of the concept of moral imagination. This search
will examine not only to the literature of psychology and education, but also philosophy
and linguistics, for a search to define moral imagination brings us to the very heart of
cognition and volition, how we deliberate about moral issues and what motivates us to act
in a moral way. This paper will offer an operational definition of moral imagination
based largely on Dewey’s model of dramatic rehearsal (Dewey, 1922; Fesmire, 2003) and
explicate the role of image schemas, metaphor, empathy, and narrative in moral
imagination, including an examination into how moral imagination develops through the
lifespan. Since there is little direct investigation of moral imagination in the literature, a
review of the research of the components of moral imagination is necessary, especially in
the literature of moral development, problem solving, and creativity. Finally, the paper
includes an avenue of research to advance our understanding of this vital and complex
human capacity.
A Definition of Moral Imagination
Both moral and imagination are complex and multifaceted terms that defy neat
description or definition. The approach of this paper will be to first define imagination
and then apply it to the moral realm. Imagination is a capacity of human thought (Singer,
1999), which, like reason, can be applied to many domains of human experience,
including the moral domain (Johnson,1993; Modell, 2003). It can be defined as simply
as the connection of unlikely elements (Wheeler-Brownlee,1985), or as comprehensively
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as “the ability to see the whole before the parts” (Kudriavtsev, 2001, p.19). Singer
(1999) takes an approach commonly found in the literature, which focuses on the making
of a mental “image.” He defines imagination as the ability of the individual to
reproduce, in the consciousness, “images or concepts originally derived from the senses”
(p. 13). These images can then be reformed or combined in new forms or new images as
the basis for future actions or works. Imagination also can be aural, involving verbal
sequences or “story–like forms” (p. 14).
Imagination goes beyond mere reproduction or even re-combinations of sensory
experience. Maxine Greene (1995) based her approach to the role of imagination in
learning on John Dewey’s understanding of imagination as “an ability to look at things as
if they could be otherwise” (p. 20). But more than this, she writes,
“as John Dewey saw it, imagination is the ‘gateway through which meanings
derived from past experience find their way into the present’; is the ‘the conscious
adjustment of the new and the old’….. Consciousness always has an imaginative
phase, and imagination, more than any other capacity, breaks through the inertia
of habit” (p. 20).
Theodore Sarbin (1998) thought there is much to learn from the pre-Cartisian
understanding of the 16th century in which imagination denoted imitating or copying, in
three-dimensional form, something from the world. An imaginer, in the pre-Renaissance
sense was an image-maker or a doer. Only at the advent of the Cartisian duality of mind
and body did imagination become a private, silent action. Sarbin defines imaginings as
“actions that serve human intentions and purposes.. (that) refer to the doings of people
rather than happenings in the mind” (p. 17). He prefers the term hypothetical
instantiation. “Instantiation means to represent an abstraction by a concrete instance…
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Hypothetical instantiation refers specifically to the act of instantiating absent objects and
events” (p. 20). Sarbin posits a three stage development of this skill: 1) Imitation:
copying out loud the actions of someone or something that can be seen and heard, 2) roletaking: copying out loud a model when that model is no longer in sight and, 3) Imagining,
i.e. role-taking in muted and storied form, as an “active, constructive copying of absent
models (where) the products of such constructional activity are narratives” (p. 21).
Mark Johnson (1993) would agree with Sarbin’s (1998) definition that
imagination involves “the active construction of absent models.” He would combine it
with Singer’s insight that imagination involves sense derived images or concepts. For
Johnson and others who draw their insights from cognitive science, imagination is based
on bodily and sensorimotor experiences such as uprightness (standing), balance
(equilibrium), motion, (travel, destination), momentum, possession of objects (Fesmire,
1994; Gibbs & Colston,1995; Lakoff & Johnson,1999; Modell, 2003). These bodily
experiences become conceptual, foundational metaphors for thinking. “Reason is
imaginative in that bodily inference forms are mapped onto abstract modes of inference
by metaphor” (Lakoff & Johnson,1999, p. 77). Thus the notion of uprightness in moral
behavior is based on sensation of standing erect. The notion of balance in justice is
based on the sensation of equilibrium in the body. The notion of walking a righteous
path is based on the experience of moving from point a to point b with the object of
reaching a destination (source-path-goal). Metaphor is the link between conscious
experience and unconscious memory (Modell, 2003). Imagination is the metaphorical
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projection of bodily experiences (embodied concepts) unto abstract concepts such as
peace, justice, morality, and social harmony (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
From these various ideas, we can begin to fashion a definition of imagination.
Imagination is the capacity to represent absent objects, constructs, events or experiences
in a hypothetical fashion using concrete experiences of bodily sensations and
sensorimotor perceptions as the basis for these representations. The abstraction from
concrete experience is a metaphorical process in which the concepts derived from bodily
sensation and sensorimotor experience guide the formation of and reasoning about the
abstraction. Kieran Egan (1999) defines imagination simply as “our capacity to think of
things as possibly being so” (p. 167).
What makes imagination moral?
Imagination becomes moral when it is utilized for the well being of others.
Notions of justice, peace, equity, fairness essentially involve the well being of individuals
embedded in social relationships of varying complexity--from intimate dyads to families,
to volunteer associations to communal arrangements to societal systems to pan-global
responsibilities. Since morality has to do with interaction with an “other” in various
levels of complexity and number, moral imagination will necessarily take into account
the perspective of the other in as complete a manner as possible. Moral imagination
would involve at least the ability to abstract the feelings, thoughts, goals, and intentions
of the “other” based on a person’s own concrete experiences (Falkenberg, 2003;
Paradales, 2002). Mark Johnson (1993) in his book Moral Imagination states:
Imagination is the means for going beyond our selves as presently formed, moving
transformatively toward imagined ideals of what we might become… moral
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imagination is our capacity to see and to realize in some actual or contemplated
experience possibilities for enhancing the quality of experience both for ourselves and
the communities of which we are a part. (p. 209)
and also:
Imagination is the means by which we are able to conceive of alternative
perspectives and to explore their implications for action, relationships, and
communal well-being. Thus, the very possibility of taking a critical stance toward
a particular viewpoint depends on our imaginative ability to envision other
viewpoints (p. 209).
Therefore, moral imagination involves perspective taking and empathy, but it is
more than just these skills. It involves the use of the imagination for empathic
perspective taking, and, in turn, taking that information to imaginatively project
(hypothetically instantiate) the possible choices available and outcomes that might
emerge given the various personalities and contingencies at work.
This is what Sarbin (1998) labeled the constructional activity of imagination. In
the pre-Renaissance, imagination was the process of imitating or copying reality by
making a three-dimensional representation. In the definition argued for here, moral
imagination is also a making of something. It is the construction of a narrative of action
which takes the perceived “realities” of the situation--the personalities and personal
character of the people involved and the kinds of actions and choices they have made in
the past, their current circumstances, the forces that constrain them, and the choices
available to them--and fashions from this situation one or several hypothetical courses of
action one of which can be enacted. In this deliberation one has all the elements of a
narrative: a plot (the presenting problem), a setting (the constraining circumstances),
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characters (discerned through empathic imagination), moving through time toward an
end.
Dewey (1922) called this deliberative process dramatic rehearsal. Steven
Fesmire (1994) describes this process in his book Dramatic Rehearsal and the Moral
Artist: A Deweyan Theory of Moral Understanding. He writes that for Dewey, dramatic
rehearsal was appropriate for any kind of scientific, aesthetic, or moral situation in which
there exist competing desires or values or one in which there is doubt. In the process of
deliberation we “try on” various possibilities for action. When the imagined outcome is
“felt to cohere with our prefigured experience and with our expectations of the future” the
deliberative process is culminated and resolved (p. 2). The resolution comes from a
“feeling” of the “fit” of the projected action.
What makes dramatic rehearsal possible, according to Dewey, is our capacity for
imagination. This imagination takes the form of a dramatic rehearsal of events in our
minds. Fesmire (1994) writes:
Imagination, like drama, is story-structured, and is spurred by conflicts and
contrasts among characters and contingent events. It is vivid and emotionally
moving and brings competing tendencies and instabilities to resolution.” (p. 3).
From How We Think, Dewey (1998) writes
[Deliberation] is a vicarious, anticipatory way of acting, a kind of dramatic
rehearsal. Were there only one suggestion popping up, we should undoubtedly
adopt it at once. But where there are two or more, they collide with one another,
maintain a state of suspense and produce further inquiry (p. 139).
And from Ethics (Dewey, 1998):
Deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct.
We give way in our mind, to some impulse, we try in our mind some plan.
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Following its career through various steps, we find ourselves, in imagination, in
the presence of the consequences that would follow. And as we then like and
approve, or dislike and approve, these consequences, we find the original plan
good or bad (p. 335).
And finally, from Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey (1922) says:
Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing
possible lines of action…. Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the
various lines of possible action are really like…. thoughts run ahead and foresee
outcomes, and thereby avoid having to await the instruction of actual failure and
disaster (p. 190).
When deliberation such as Dewey describes occurs over moral issues--when
people engage in “active construction of absent models” (Sarbin,1998) to solve moral
dilemmas--they are engaging moral imagination. Moral Imagination in this Deweyan
sense is “the capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what it could
be” (Fesmire, 2003, p. 65). This type of activity has a decidedly narrative structure as we
attempt to plot a course of action taking into account the various elements that affect our
moral decisions. We take our previous experience and understanding of the way things
ought to go together with our understanding of the characters involved, their
circumstances and setting, and play out various courses of action and their consequences
in order to prove the best choice for moral action. This method of deliberation (Johnson,
1985), I define as moral imagination.
The four components of moral imagination
In order to adequately utilize our moral imagination as described above, four
skills or cognitive tools must be in place: (a) the image and experiential schemas
activated through our deliberation (previous experience); (b) The way we reason about
moral issues through conceptual metaphors (understanding of the way things ought to
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go) (c) An ability to take the perspective of others and empathize with them
(understanding character); and (d) An ability to frame the circumstances of the people
and the moral issues involved (setting ). This model posits four components of moral
Imagination: schemas, metaphors, empathy, and framing (Johnson, 1993; Modell, 2003;
Zaw,1996).
These four components are similar to what Mark Johnson describes as the four
elements of moral imagination (Johnson, 1993). He says moral imagination is composed
of: 1) the prototype structure of concepts 2) the framing of situations 3) metaphor and 4)
narrative. Where this model differs from Johnson is with the elements of empathy and
narrative. Rather than viewing narrative as an element of moral imagination, it is viewed
as constitutive of moral imagination. It is not a part of moral imagination it is the whole.
Moral imagination, as is argued above, is a narrative enterprise--a hypothetical
instantiation (Sarbin, 1998)--a dramatic rehearsal (Dewey, 1922). While Johnson views
narrative as one of four elements in moral imagination, his description betrays a more
comprehensive view, for he states:
Narrative makes it possible for us not only to explore the consequences of
decisions and commitments over an extended period of time, but also to reflect on
the concrete particularities that make up the fine texture of our actual moral
experience. It invites us to develop our perception of character, of what is
important in a given situation and of the subtly interwoven threads of our moral
entanglements. ….The power of fictional narrative to develop our moral
sensitivity, our ability to make subtle discriminations and our empathy for others,
is thus the result of the narrative structure of our lives… Narrative explorations of
this sort are, in fact, what moral reasoning is all about (Johnson, 1993, p. 196-7,
original emphasis).
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Another difference between Johnson’s understanding of moral imagination and
the one presented here is in the conception of the role of empathy. What is usually called
empathy in the psychological literature (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987), he labels empathic
imagination. For Johnson empathy is a form of moral imagination--a method of moral
reasoning (see also Kekes, 1995; Tivnan, 1995). “Reflecting in this way [through
empathic imagination] involves an imaginative rationality through which we can
participate empathically in another’s experience….Morally sensitive people are capable
of living out, in and through such experiential imagination, the reality of others with
whom they are interacting, or whom their actions might affect” (Johnson, 1993, p. 200).
Therefore, what Johnson calls empathic imagination, is more properly labeled moral
imagination. For example, he equates the activity of “taking up the place of the other”
with the term “dramatic rehearsal” (p. 200). Johnson’s concern is to give empathy an
exalted place in moral reasoning to counter the traditional separation of feeling from
reason in the moral philosophy of Kant and Rawls (Johnson, 1985, 1993). In this paper it
is viewed, rather, as a critical element or component of moral imagination – a part of
moral imagination rather than a form of moral imagination. Therefore, empathy, along
with personal experience (in the form of image and prototypical schemas) and metaphor,
are the constitutive elements of the narrative enterprise called moral imagination.
What follows is a description from the literature of the four components of moral
imagination in this order: experiential schemas, framing, empathy, and metaphor. Each
description will include a definition, how the concept is measured, its correlates, and how
the capacity develops through the lifespan.
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Experiential Schemas. There are two types of schemas that need to be defined and
distinguished. The first is image schemas which are defined as “organizing structures of
experience at the level of bodily perception and movement (Gibbs & Colston, 1995, p.
349) and the second I call experiential schemas which can be made up of image schema
but represent more complex behavioral patterns in memory and cognition. (May,
Friedman, & Clark, 1996; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999).
Of the two types, image schemas are more particular and less well known.
Defined as “dynamic analog representations [derived from perceptual and motor
processes] of spatial relations and movements in space,” (Gibbs, 1997), they are most
widely talked about in cognitive linguistics where scientists have noticed how language
across domains has similar concepts grounded in our bodily experiences and actions, our
perceptual interactions, and the way we manipulate objects (Gibbs & Colston, 1995).
As we grow and learn about the world through manipulating objects, by orienting
ourselves in space and time and directing the focus of our perception, we form image
schemas which become foundational concepts for thinking and reasoning (Gibbs &
Colston, 1995). For example, Gibbs (1997) reported the results of his analysis of the
various uses of the word “stand” across domains (interpersonal relations, law, science,
politics). He was able to reduce the meanings to 5 perceptual bodily experiences
(balance, verticality, center-periphery, resistance and linkage). The meaning of the word
depends on which bodily/spatial experience dominates. These image schemas then
become the basis for the conceptual metaphors we use to think about our experience (for
instance, “love is a journey,” Gibbs, 1997). Image schemas are not tied to any one
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perceptual modality. They are more abstract than mere images and rely more on spatial
patterns and dynamic interaction in movement and spatial relations. Gibbs (1995) has
identified over two dozen image schemas that appear in our thinking, reasoning, and
imagining on a regular basis.
Experiential schemas, on the other hand can include but are not limited to image
schemas. Rest et al. (1999) define a schema as “a general knowledge structure, residing
in long-term memory that is invoked (or activated) by current stimulus configurations
that resemble previous stimuli” (p. 136). Schemas come to play when we encounter new
information and apply our organized generic prior knowledge to the understanding of it.
They operate like hypotheses or presuppositions about the way the world works and help
focus attention and give structure to experience through expectations and preconceptions.
Sometimes called prototypes they are a kind of average (the statistical central tendency)
of all similar experiences (May et al., 1996).
Schemas work by a process similar to Piaget's notion of assimilation. A schema
has slots that can be filled in by particular experiences. If the slots are not filled in by the
experience at hand, then a schema supplies the information. What schemas do is to
enable us to identify the parameters of experience quickly; chunk the experience into an
appropriate unit; fill in missing information and provide guidance for obtaining further
information, solving a problem, or reaching a goal (Rest et al., 1999). Cognitive schemas
theorists (CST) have identified a hierarchy of schemas from the most simplistic, like
memory objects (things related by characteristics) to cognitive fields (a set of memory
objects activated by an experience) to mental models (the overall meaning structure of a
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given experience) (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). The central idea is that knowledge is stored
in a related and connected way, which enables us to adapt to our environment more
quickly by guiding our perceptions and learning.
In the moral realm, image schemas have their greatest impact in how they guide
thinking about moral issues through metaphor. For example, the bodily experience of
balance and equilibrium guides our thinking about equity and fair distribution of wealth
(Johnson, 1985). The more general, cognitive schemas (CST) also affect our moral
reasoning. By helping us anticipate the issues of any given moral situation, we are able
to process our thoughts more quickly. By the same token they can work against moral
imagination by constraining our thought patterns to the schema.
Rest et al. (1999) use cognitive schema theory (CST) to explain the development
of moral reasoning originally posited by Kohlberg and measured by Rest’s Defining
Issues Test (DIT). They claim that those who exhibit the complex moral judgments of
Kohlberg’s post-conventional moral reasoning stage “have a larger, better organized set
of memory objects that can be activated within multiple cognitive fields and form part of
complex mental models” (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). Narveaz (1998) tested this hypothesis
with a group of eighth graders and college students. After reading four texts in
succession in which moral stage schemas (1-5) were embedded, the students were asked
to recall the general content of the story. Results show that those with higher moral
judgment scores (DIT), reconstructed significantly more stage 5 reasoning than did those
with lower scores. Moreover, college students recalled significantly more stage 5 than
stage 1-4 moral arguments than the eighth graders. Narveaz (1998) also reports that
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students inferred reasoning not present in the stories, suggesting that the prior knowledge
of moral schemas influenced the recall of stories.
The research in image schema and cognitive schema theory establish that humans
bring highly structured prior knowledge to the process of moral deliberation and our use
of moral imagination. These structures are a part of the raw material that goes into the
narrative instantiation process as we imagine possible courses of action in our
imagination. Image schemas give us metaphors and ways to think about moral situations.
Cognitive schemas give us “packaged” experiences that guide the construction of
possible outcomes in our imagination. Both image and cognitive schemas grow over
time in two significant way: (a) as we gain more life experience we have more schemas
available (more image schemas, more memory objects which build more cognitive fields
and mental models) and (b) as we use these schemas in moral deliberation we become
more proficient with them and make more connections among schemas. Thus we would
expect that the capacity for moral imagination would likewise have a developmental
trajectory and grow over time.
Framing moral situations. Johnson (1993) states: “the situations in which we find
ourselves and in which we must decide how to act do not come with their one and only
proper descriptions attached, we must conceptualize them in a certain way” (p. 192).
The way we conceptualize them is called framing. The way we frame experience will
determine if we consider a situation a moral dilemma or not. For example, it takes a
particular view of gender roles, for a woman to see as unfair the need to constantly pick
up after her husband , even if that view is widely shared (Colby, 2000). As far back as
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1948, Solomon Asch proved that the very meaning of a message changes as a function of
the source to which it is attributed (Ross, 1990). The source attribution frames the
interpretation of the message. For example, an identical arms reduction proposal was less
well received by American students when attributed to M. Gorbachev, the Russian
President at the time of the study than when attributed to R. Regan, the American
President. The framing of a situation will determine, in part, our reaction to it. It appears
that if an issue is framed as an ethical issue, highlighting the ethical implications, it
engenders a different response than if that same issue is framed as a material issue. In
making a decision about a political candidate, students who received information on that
candidate in an ethical textual frame were significantly more likely to refuse to make
compensations for issues that conflicted with their view on that issue than those who
were presented the information in a material frame (Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 1996).
The same effect on subsequent decisions holds when individuals frame the
situation for themselves. Rothman and Salovey (1997), expanding on the famous
framing effect of the 1981 experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (in which people chose
different options depending on whether the identical information was framed as a gain or
a loss), found that people will act on health information only if the recommended
behavior matches their adopted framing of the issue (gain-framed or loss-framed).
Moreover, it appears that the influence of the framing of a situation holds for both
hypothetical and real decisions (Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002). This
and other research indicates that framing has a strong influence on decisions. One way to
overcome the constraints of framing is to encourage multiple construals of a situation.
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Griffin, Dunning, and Ross (1990) found that participants in their study stuck to the
confident predictions they inferred from their initial assessment of a situation even when
they were told their inference may be wrong. Only those who were specifically asked to
make multiple construals of the situation after their initial assessment, showed a lower
confidence in their initial assessment. This study shows both the power of the initial
framing of a situation and the potential remedy of imagination (multiple construals) to
find creative solutions to entrenched moral problems.
Framing depends on experience. If we grant that experience is available to us
through schemas then schemas will influence the way situations are framed (Johnson,
1993). The need to frame situations is constant in our development. Therefore, the
ability to frame of situation does not seem to change much over time. Individual
differences in framing ability come from the variety of experience that each person has.
However, the ability to imagine multiple construals of a situation would, at least,
hypothetically change over time. The more experiences one has allows for greater
possibilities for framing situations in multiple ways.
Empathy. Empathy is, by its very definition, an imaginative construct. Maxine
Greene (1995) put it this way: “imagination is what makes empathy possible” (p. 3).
Indeed, empirical studies show a positive relationship between imagination and empathy
(Rabinowitz & Heinhorn, 1984-85). This is because empathy involves sharing another’s
cognitive and emotional state (Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 1998;
Roberts & Strayer, 1996). Since one can only directly experience one’s thoughts and
emotions, one must use imagination to experience the thoughts and emotions of others.
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Even as far back as Hume, what we call empathy (and he called “sympathy’ or “sharing
the concern of others”) was viewed as central to moral deliberation (Johnson, 1993).
Coined in the early 1900’s by Titchner, the term is a translation of einfuhlung, used by
German aesthetic philosophers to denote feeling “into” another’s experience (from the
Greek em = in; pathos = feeling or suffering) as opposed to sympathy, which is feeling
with someone (sym = with; pathos = feeling or suffering) (Wispe, 1987). Eisenberg and
Miller (1987) offer this classic definition:
Empathy is an affective state stemming from apprehensions of another’s
emotional state or condition and which is congruent with it (p. 292).
The apprehension of another’s state is a complex phenomenon but certainly it involves
imagination (Strayer, 1987).
From a summary reading of the literature, empathy involves three salient features:
emotional response, emotional insight, and perspective/role taking. Janet Strayer (1987)
calls emotional response the “sine qua non of empathy” (p. 226). Some researchers make
a distinction in the emotional responses related to empathy between sympathy and
personal distress, depending on whether the response is other focused (sympathy) or selffocused (personal distress) (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 1998; Hoffman, 1998).
Emotional insight involves insight into one’s own as well as another’s emotions. Roberts
and Strayer (1996) have shown that a child’s insight into his or her own emotion is
positively related to empathy. Also, training in the recognition of both verbal and nonverbal emotional cues along with labeling those emotions will increase empathy
(Eisenberg, Wentzel & Harris, 1998; Feshbach, 1989). Finally, all the most prevalent
models and definitions of empathy include perspective/role taking, commonly defined as
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the cognitive (Roberts & Strayer,1996). Role taking is recognized by many moral
theorists as a critical skill in moral reasoning (Colby, 2000; Johnson, 1996; Kekes, 1995;
Modell, 2003; Tivnan, 1995).
Empathy has a distinct developmental path. Longitudinal and cross sectional
studies show a growth in empathy over time (Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, &
Shea, 1991; Hoffman, 1998; Roberts & Strayer, 1996). The main growth is in the
cognitive side of empathy, that is, the perspective and role taking skills. Children also
gain more awareness and mastery over their emotions, contributing to increased empathy
(Roberts & Strayer, 1996). The cognitive function of perspective taking is often labeled
as a work of the imagination (Upright, 2002). Recent work involving PET scans of
subjects who were asked to take a third-person perspective shows that similar regions of
the brain that are activated while in first person perspective are also activated while
taking a third-person perspective. The differences seem to be in the areas associated with
self-consciousness. (Ruby & Decety, 2001). These findings are consistent with
developmental theories that posit the acquisition of a self-other distinction as critical to
the growth of empathy in children (Hoffman, 1998; Strayer, 1993).
Metaphor. Arnold Modell (2003) would take this last point in our discussion of
empathy as concrete evidence of the metaphorical nature of empathy. In his book
Imagination and the Meaningful Brain, he states:
Empathic imagination… relies on metaphor, for within an empathic connection
there is a play of similarity and different based on metaphor. Empathy requires
this play of similarity and difference: one recognizes a sense of identity with the
other while at the same time retaining one’s sense of self “ (p. 118).
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Samuel Johnson said in metaphor there are “two ideas in one” (Kittay, 1997). In the case
of empathy, personal experience becomes the vehicle for the experience of the other.
When Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and other cognitive linguists speak of metaphor,
they mean more than just a creative use of language. They mean that certain bodily
experiences of space, time, and objects become the basis for understanding other
experiences. These metaphors are called conceptual metaphors. “Metaphors allow
conventional mental imagery from sensorimotor domains to be used for domains of
subjective experience” (p. 45). These conceptual metaphors are pervasive and operate
largely unconsciously. These metaphors are acquired automatically over time, from
merely experiencing the world in ordinary ways. Lakoff and Johnson’s claim is this:
“we all naturally think using hundreds of primary metaphors” (p. 47). Here is a list of
some of these metaphors: Affection is Warmth; Important is Big; Intimacy is Closeness;
More is Up; Similarity is Closeness; Help is Support; Time is Motion; States are
Locations; Causes are Physical Forces; Knowing is Seeing; Understanding is Grasping
(pp. 50-54). From these examples we see that the sensorimotor experience becomes the
vehicle to understand the subjective experience.
The way linguistic metaphors operate can helps us to grasp how conceptual
metaphors work. Gentner and Wolff (2000) suggest that metaphors work because of the
matching of structured relations as opposed to a mere list of shared independent features.
In previous studies, they demonstrated that people prefer to match predicates belonging
to interconnected systems of knowledge and not just independent components. In a metaanalysis of the persuasive effects of metaphors, Sopory and Dillard (2002) found that the
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one view that explained most of the supported hypothesis of the studies involved was the
superior organization view, which states that metaphors facilitate selection and
integration of information from the message and prior knowledge. When metaphors were
placed at the beginning of a message and were extended, they were most persuasive.
This supports the notion that metaphors facilitate the connection of concepts. Those
concepts that are closely matched in our experience make metaphor comprehension
easier. Subjects had more difficulty with metaphors in which the vehicle and target were
semantically disparate than when they were semantically related. (Kintsch & Bowles,
2002).
The key to the operation of metaphors is that they help us understand something
in terms of something else. In the case of empathy, we understand another’s feelings in
terms of our own. In the case of conceptual metaphors, we understand things in terms of
basic sensorimotor experience. Cognition is characterized by connectivity--making
operations between a known object (the vehicle) and an unknown one (the topic). Image
schemas (as well as complex cognitive schemas) also operate through this metaphorical,
connective process. We connect new experiences with old experiences, organized in
schemas and scripts, to help us understand and make our way through the new
experience. Metaphors, like schemas and framing, can both expand our categories of
thought and restrict them (Fitzgerald, 1993). They can reinforce old connections and
categories or make new ones.
The comprehension of metaphors also follows a developmental trajectory.
Winner, Rosentiel and Gardner (1976) discover that metaphorical production follows this
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path: a child can spontaneously produce metaphors before he or she can comprehend
them. This is followed by an ability to explain the rational of metaphor. Like adults,
children also have an easier time of understanding metaphors whose components are
semantically related then when the relationship is less clear (Cacciari, Levorato, &
Cicogna, 1997). Sietz (1997) found that younger children have a preference for more
natural, concrete metaphors, whereas older children exhibit a preference for more
abstract, socially constructed metaphors. Sietz was testing for the “ability to detect unity
in variety” (p. 348), a skill related to both metaphor comprehension and creativity. When
presented with a list of words grouped in triads, with two of the words metaphorically
related and two related by surface similarities, younger children violated category
boundaries based on an innate sense of similarity whereas older children violated
category boundaries that relied on learning. Seitz concludes metaphor is important in
creative thought because metaphor does not merely highlight existing similarity but
creates similarity. Similarity, which is at the heart of metaphor, is, of course, a product of
thought, and does not merely exist in the world.
Assessing Moral Imagination
To discuss whether moral imagination can be assessed, we must come to some
definition of its outcome. For this we turn to some of the definitions of imagination
mentioned above.
“Imagining is.. instantiating absent objects and events” (Sarbin, 1998).
“Imagination is our capacity to think of things as possibly being so” (Egan, 1997).
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“Imaginative capacity is … the ability to look at things as if they could be
otherwise …It is to see beyond what the imaginer has called normal or “commonsensible” and to carve out new orders in experience” (Greene, 1995).
“Imagination is an act of creation, a making of something new, the reformation or
combination of experience into new forms” (Singer, 1999).
“Imagination… breaks through the inertia of habit” (Dewey cited in Greene,
1995).
Among these definitions (and, in fact, most definitions) there is a consensus that
imagination is an act--a thinking, a doing, a making of something new. As an act, we
ought to be able to empirically verify its existence. It could be measured as the capacity
of making up new things.
Vygotsky defined creativity in a way similar to these definitions of imagination.
He defined creative activity as one that constructs something new. He distinguishes
between reproductive construction (the rebuilding of existing reality) and combinatory
construction, (the combination and changing of existing reality to new entities). It is the
latter that requires imagination and is seen as the basis for creativity (Ayman-Nolley,
1992).
Creativity and imagination are linked in our common-sense definitions as well. In
a study in which parents and teachers from America and India were asked to find
descriptive terms for creativity among a list of 15 terms (Runco & Johnson, 2002), the
raw scores for Imaginative as a descriptor for Creative had the highest Likert scale
average among the American parents and teachers as well as the Indian parents (4.80,
4.83 and 4.31 respectively). Indian parents rated Curious as equally descriptive of
Creative as Imaginative (4.31) while American and Indian teachers rated it second most
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descriptive (4.63 and 4.24 respectively). Indian teachers viewed Inventive as the most
descriptive term for Creativity (4.27) a trait the American parents placed second most
descriptive (4.53). All averages were from a scale of 1 (not at all descriptive) to 5
(extremely descriptive). These results show Imaginative, Curious, and Inventive as the
most descriptive of creativity among parents and teachers in both counties.
One of the salient features of creativity and imaginative thought is divergent
thinking. While not necessarily synonymous with creativity, it is often part of many
creativity measures (Wakefield, 1991). Divergent thinking is characterized by flexible
cognitive functioning--a capacity to represent problems in a variety of ways (Gallo,
1989; Milgram,1983; Runco, Plucker & Lim, 2000). In the literature on creativity, it is
often measured as the capacity to think of new things to do with familiar objects
(Milgram, 1983; Runco, Plucker & Lim, 2000).
Milgram (1983) tested the validity of a procedure that measured ideational
fluency. From a sample of 7- to13-year old lower- to middle-class children with a variety
of intelligence levels, she found that the ability to generate many solutions to a problem is
strongly associated with the ability to produce a few original, high quality solutions. She
concluded that ideational fluency is a critical cognitive component of the creative process
in children. Runco et al. (2000) claimed that ideation is a valid empirical measure
because ideas can be quantified in much the same way as other products. He developed a
23-item scale that measures three facets of divergent thinking: originality (unique ideas),
fluency (the quantity of ideas) and flexibility (the number if different ideas). These three
aspects of divergent thinking have been traditionally measured by asking subjects to
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produce as many uses for a common item (e.g. a brick) as possible. Fluency is
determined by the number of ideas, flexibility by the difference between the ideas (not
just variations on a theme) and originality by comparing the ideas within others in the
sample (original means used by less than 5% of the sample) (Milgram, 1983). There is
an order effect for original thinking as well with the most original ideas coming after the
common (or popular) ideas (Hong & Milgram, 1995). Researchers in divergent thinking
and evaluation have asked children to rate an idea produced by another child as creative
(i.e., original) or popular. Children were able to identify the popular ideas the best. In
adults of all contexts, the ability to evaluate ideas and the fluency of ideas are related and
are significantly correlated, while in children, the correlation depends on the context of
test format and group makeup (Runco, 2003). In the moral realm, the question of the best
solution is often in play. Therefore, any test of imagination would, like creativity,
involve divergent thinking and evaluative (convergent thinking) skills.
There are a number of theories and empirical studies to support them that link
creativity and morality (Gruber, 1993; Runco & Nemiro, 2003 ). Grisanti and Gruber
(1999) define moral creativity as “creativity for moral purpose.. when a moral imperative
is present but the problem is so overwhelming as to challenge a person’s ability to
address it--creativity becomes necessary” (p. 427, see also Gruber, 1993). Some who
research creativity by means of problem finding and problem solving skills use “real
world” problems to assess these abilities. The skills assessed in these and other studies
(such as problem finding skill and evaluation) could be used to study how people solve
moral dilemmas (Runco, 1993, 2003).
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On the empirical side, Kyzer (2001) reported on a study of undergraduates that
found a relationship between creativity and personal problems solving (self-reported).
He cites another study of 9-12 year old children demonstrating that highly creative
children have better coping skills in stressful situations of life and relationships. The
authors conclude that because they are able to think more fluently, flexibly, originally,
and open-mindedly, more solutions are available to them in stressful situations and thus
better coping skills.
Mouchiroud and Lubart (2002) created three scenarios of conflict involving a
friend (dyad), a group of peers and parents and presented these to a group of 6 – 11 year
old children. The children were encouraged to come up with as many solutions to the
conflicts as possible. The purpose of the research was to establish the existence of social
creativity. The result showed a moderately strong to strong correlation between the
scenarios which gave rise to the claim by the researchers that the construct was valid.
They also found a significant developmental trend with older children providing more
solutions than younger. Based on findings in the literature, fluency is the main dependent
measure that correlates originality with the number of ideas formed.
In an exploratory study for his Ph. D. dissertation, (Rolison, 1986) developed an
instrument to assess a person’s ability to generate alternatives in social, decision-making
situations (the Rolison Real Issues Alternatives Test, RRIAT). He found a positive
relationship between moral development (measured by Rest’s DIT) and the RRIAT (r .23 p< .03). There is also a positive correlation between the ability to produce alternative
uses for an object (Guiliford’s AUT) and the RRIAT (r = .33 p. < .01). Age and general
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knowledge were also positively related to generating alternatives in social, decisionmaking situations (r = .21, p. < .05; r = .32; p. < .01, respectively).
Assessment tools
The results of these studies point to a possible method for studying moral
imagination that would involve employing tests typically used in the study of creativity
such as ideational fluency, originality, and flexibility and applying them to moral
situations. One could envision a task in which subjects were presented with moral
dilemmas (perhaps drawn from Kohlberg’s original research or perhaps newly created
dilemmas) and asked to come up with as many solutions as possible to the dilemmas.
The results could be scored for fluency (number of ideas), flexibility (number of
categories of ideas) and originality (less than 5% occurrence of the idea in the sample).
To test evaluative skills, the participants could be asked to pick the one idea they think is
the most practical and the one they think the most creative. These ideas also could be
analyzed for originality. While there are certainly issues of reliability in coding
responses and other complications, using the methods of assessment in the creativity
domain for the purpose of measuring moral imagination seems a promising avenue of
pursuit.
Conclusion
Moral Imagination is a difficult subject to review, not only because of its
complexity, but also because there is not a great deal of consensus in the literature over
its definition, much less any established empirical investigation of it. Thus we are left to
our own imagination, to create new combinations of ideas, new categories, and new
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methods with which to investigate them. This has been the purpose of this paper. By
defining moral imagination as a narrative projection of action into the future through a
process of dramatic rehearsal, the best methods for investigating would be to design a
study in which participants are presented with short narratives (in the forms of dilemmas)
and told to create as many endings to the dilemmas as come to mind. By coding these
responses in terms of fluency, flexibility, and originality, we could have a basis for
assessing the moral imagination of an individual. By further coding these responses for
flexibility and originality in their use of metaphors, we would have a more complete
understanding of the ability of the individual to use imagination in moral situations, since
metaphors are a critical tool in moral reasoning (Johnson, 1993). By adding a final task
to the assessment and asking the participant to choose the best and most creative solution
to the dilemma, we would get an even broader idea of the level of capacity for moral
imagination in the individual since evaluation along with divergent thinking are critical
skills in creativity and imagination (Runco, 2003). No investigation into moral
imagination would be complete without some assessment of the individual’s capacity for
empathy. A separate assessment would perhaps be necessary as an adjunct to the
ideational fluency test to round out the picture of an individual’s potential for moral
imagination. The relationship of this assessment of moral imagination to the traditional
measures of moral reasoning, such as the DIT, would be interesting to explore.
The goal of developing a measure for moral imagination would be to have a tool
to assess programming and curriculum that would teach the skills needed for the
development of moral imagination. In a world in which the old solutions do not seem to
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be working, it seems imperative that we develop this skill in our children, so that in the
face of moral problems they have the fluency, flexibility, and originality of thought to
“break through the inertia of habit” and create new orders of experience (Greene, 1995)
that are more just and caring than exist at the present
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CHAPTER 2
USING HOLLYWOOD FILMS TO TEACH MORAL REASONING AND
GOOD CHARACTER: EVALUATING A FILM CLIPS
CHARACTER EDUCATION CURRICULUM
Introduction
In the later third of the 20th century two approaches to moral education have
prevailed (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005; Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 2006;
Walker, Henning, & Krettenauer, 2000) which have their roots in two “historic” visions
of a child’s moral nature. One approach, often called traditional character education
(Bennett, 1993; Narvaez et al., 2006), has its roots in the assumption that children cannot
on their own, without direct adult guidance, form a moral disposition. The emphasis of
the traditional character education approach places the driving force of moral formation
of children in the hands of adults (parents, teachers, and others). Concern with the
content of moral education more than the process, the proponents of this approach see
exposure to good moral role models, teaching values and traits that promote moral action,
and reinforcing prosocial behavior as the most effective means of developing a moral
disposition in a child.
The rational moral education approach (Gibbs, 2003; Kohlberg, 1981; Narvaez et
al., 2006) views children as having an innate capacity for positive moral growth.
Proponents assume children bring capacities and experiences that shape their own moral
38
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dispositions and are co-constructors of their moral formation. This approach is based, in
large part, on the work of Jean Piaget, who observed that children progressed in moral
formation (from heteronomous to autonomous) when they took their moral life into their
own hands (Hoffman, 2000; Piaget, 1962). Rational moral education focuses on the
process of moral development by emphasizing student participation through such
methods as collaborative peer interaction (Moran & John-Stiener, 2003; Vygotsky,
1978), moral dilemma discussion (Kohlberg, 1981; Walker et al., 2000), a democratic
classroom culture (Dewey, 1938), and role play (Gibbs, 2003).
Entering the 21st century a consensus is developing that neither assumption tells
the whole story of the moral child, but that moral formation is a complex phenomenon
requiring both collaborative learning and content instruction, role play and good role
models, a democratic school culture and morally authoritative adults (Berkowitz & Bier,
2005; Walker et al., 2000). A recognition that a moral disposition is multi-faceted and,
like other psychological constructs such as intelligence (Gardner, 2004), involves
complex sets of skills, traits, and abilities that can be acquired and expressed in multiple
ways (Narvaez et al., 2006), has resulted in the design of programs in moral formation
that feature a blending of content and process. This study investigates a particular
character education curriculum using film clips from Hollywood films to demonstrate
both positive and negative examples of character traits listed in many character education
curricula. The curriculum takes a blended approach utilizing the film clip as the occasion
for teaching the content of the character traits and reinforces good behavior by using the
characters in the film clips as either positive or negative models, in line with the
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traditional character education approach. The methods of rational moral education are
employed through subsequent discussion of the film clips and classroom activities that
engage the student in forming a moral position vis-à-vis the character trait in question.
The viewing of the film clips also becomes an occasion for role play, group discussion,
and other collaborative learning events.
The question of this study is: does this particular blended approach using film
clips for character education work to enhance skills critical to moral development and
moral action and, if so, why? I will focus on three mechanisms present in the curriculum
that the literature suggests play a role in moral development: training in cognitive
perspective taking, training in affective perspective taking (empathy), and moral dilemma
discussions.
Perspective Taking and Moral Development
Researchers and theorists of moral development have found it useful to delineate
between different types of perspective taking (Carlo, Allen & Buhman, 2006; Eisenberg
et al.,1998; Hoffman, 2000). Social or cognitive perspective taking apprehends the
thoughts, intentions, and situation of another. Affective perspective taking involves an
understanding of the emotional states of others. Perceptual or spatial perspective taking
concerns imagining the visual perspective of another (Eisenberg et al., 1998). Knowing
oneself as distinct from the other is a critical skill for perspective taking (Selman, 1971)
and empathy (Batson, 1991).
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Cognitive Perspective Taking. Cognitive perspective taking has long been
recognized as an essential capacity for moral development (Lapsley, 2006). Piaget
recognized that a child can only advance in knowledge of the world in general and
knowledge of the moral and social realm in particular with the ability to separate one’s
own perspective from another in a social situation and to attend to it. Piaget’s two stages
of moral development depend, in part, on this capacity. The heteronomous stage requires
at least the capacity to take the adult’s perspective and to conform to it, while the
autonomous stage requires the more sophisticated ability to separate one’s own
perspective from that of the adult (or other authority) and coordinate those perspectives
along with the perspective of one’s peers in moral decision making and action (Gibbs,
2003).
Kohlberg (1981) placed role taking (a synonym for perspective taking) at the
center of his moral stage theory. “The centrality of role taking is recognized in the notion
that moral judgment is based on sympathy for others” (p. 141). While role taking
includes both cognitive and affective perspective taking, the emphasis for Kohlberg was
on the cognitive since he understood such concepts of justice, reciprocity, and equality as
“part of the primary experience of role taking in social interactions” (p. 143).
Affective Perspective Taking (Empathy). Empathy is a complex response to
others that includes both cognitive and affective perspective taking (Batson,1991;
Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea,1991; Feshbach,1989; Hoffman, 1987;
Roberts & Strayer,1996). However, without an insight into the emotional state of others,
empathy is not possible. Hoffman (2000) views perspective taking as a primary form of
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empathic arousal. Eisenberg, Spinrad, and Sadovsky (2006) believe that the
developmental increase in empathy supported by empirical data is due to the advances
children make in perspective taking and an understanding of another’s feelings. Strayer
(1987) called affective perspective taking the sine qua non of empathy. She states
empathy involves a “leap of the imagination entailed in feeling as if we were the other
person in his or her situation” (p. 223). However, cognitive perspective taking still plays
an important role. In a test of their model of empathy, Roberts and Strayer (1996)
demonstrated a significant correlation between cognitive perspective taking and empathy.
Having a perspective on one’s own emotions as well as the emotions of others
contributes to moral development. Research indicates that a child’s insight into his or her
own emotion is positively related to empathy (Roberts & Strayer 1996), while training
children to recognize verbal and nonverbal emotional cues and labeling those emotions
also increase empathy (Eisenberg et al.,1998; Feshbach,1989; Frey, Hirschstein, &
Guzzo, 2000). Bengtsson and Johnson (1992) found that those who focused on the inner
experience of a person when confronted by their plight had higher empathy scores.
Eisenberg, Murphy, and Shepherd (1997) linked age-related advances in empathy to both
affective and cognitive perspective taking in their study of empathic accuracy. For
Hoffman (2000), however, another’s emotional state can affect someone before the
ability to distinguish between self and other has developed.
Perspective Taking and Prosocial Behavior. It is the proper balance of a focus on
one’s own emotions conjoined with the apprehension of the emotions of others that leads
to prosocial responding (Batson, 1991; Carlo, Allen & Bulman, 1999; Eisenberg,

43
Wentzel, & Harris, 1998; Hoffman, 1987; Strayer, 1993). Research demonstrates that
high levels of personal distress in affective perspective taking inhibits prosocial
responding (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Strayer, 1993). Carlo et al. (1999) found that high
levels of personal distress and low levels of perspective taking inhibited prosocial
responding in a sample of college students, while the opposite (high perspective taking
and low personal distress) promoted prosocial action. They propose that personal distress
causes one to focus on oneself more than the other, leading to a desire to alleviate one’s
own distress rather than another’s. Strayer (1993) found similar reactions in children.
When observing the emotions of others in video taped vignettes, children whose
emotional intensity levels were higher than the stimulus person’s showed lower empathy
with others.
Training in Perspective Taking: Induction. Martin Hoffmann (2000) has
developed a theory of how children form a moral disposition through the parent’s use of
perspective taking in disciplining their children. The technique he calls induction occurs
when a parent takes the perspective of the victim when a child is about to harm or has
harmed someone and demonstrates to the child how the child’s behavior harms the
victim. Building on his concept of empathic distress, (not the same as personal distress,
above) that develops from an innate proclivity to feel the feelings of another coupled with
the cognitive ability to separate one’s own perception from others, Hoffman (2000) states
that inductions:
a) … call attention to the victim’s distress and make it salient to the child, thus
tapping into the child’s empathic proclivity (using it as an ally) by activating any
or all of his or her empathy-arousing mechanisms and producing empathic
distress, and b) inductions point up the role of the child’s action in causing that
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distress. This creates the condition for feeling empathy-based guilt, which is a
feeling of intense disesteem for oneself for wrongfully harming another (p. 151).
These inductions form a kind of moral script for the child, called the
Transgression–Induction–Guilt script. These scripts are reinforced time and again,
adding a moral dimension to the parent/child induction through the focus on the impact of
the child’s behavior on others. Eventually, the script can be activated in the absence of
the parent (or other authority) and is reduced to a Transgression-Guilt script, becoming
“less kinesthetic-imagistic and more semantic-propositional” (p. 161). These scripts are
activated in conflict situations with peers, and, insofar as the child is able to de-center
(i.e., the child can take on the perspective of the victim on his or her own), the child can
provide the parent’s induction of the victim’s perspective by himself or herself.
Krevans and Gibbs (1996) tested Hoffman’s theory that inductive discipline
would lead to greater empathy and prosocial responding in children. They found that
children who exhibited high scores on prosocial behavior measures had parents who used
inductive discipline. Moreover, the researchers found that empathy mediated the
influence of the use of inductive discipline by parents on the prosocial behavior of their
children. When the score of inductive discipline was included with the child’s empathy
score as the independent variable with the child’s prosocial behavior score as the
dependent variable, the resulting regression differed significantly from zero but the beta
weight of the inductive discipline score was reduced and no longer significant.
Moral Expertise. Induction and schema theory has not only impacted theories on
the development of empathy (Hoffmann, 2000), but has provided a framework for
researchers in the development of moral reasoning as well (Narvaez & Lapsley, in press;

45
Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a). One direction that scholars have taken is to
investigate the concept of moral expertise. Partly rising out of Colby and Damon’s
(1992) work on moral exemplars, researchers have begun to ask the question “What
makes one a moral expert?”. Narvaez and Lapsley (in press) look to schema theory and
aver that it is “the chronic accessibility of moral schemas and other knowledge
structures” that distinguish the novice from the expert in moral functioning (p. 10).
Experts are adept at picking up salient clues in the environment and responding with the
most appropriate action from a vast store of schemas to meet the need of the situation.
Expertise is developed through learning behaviors that work, upon which they reflect to
understand why they work and then practice those behaviors in an intentional way until
they become automatic. According to this view “moral character may depend upon a kind
of socialization that inculcates highly routinized action sequences, scripted interpersonal
procedures, and patterns of discrimination and judgment” (Narvaez & Lapsley, in press,
p. 12).
Rest et al. (1999a) use Cognitive Schema Theory to explain the development of
moral reasoning originally posited by Kohlberg and measured by Rest’s Defining Issues
Test (DIT). They and others who follow their lead claim that those who exhibit the
complex moral judgments of Kohlberg’s post-conventional moral reasoning stage “have a
larger, better organized set of memory objects that can be activated within multiple
cognitive fields and form part of complex mental models” (Narvaez & Bock, 2002, p.
301). Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, and Bentley (1999) tested this hypothesis with a group
of eighth graders and college students. After reading four texts in succession in which

46
moral stage schemas (1-5) were embedded, the students were asked to recall the general
content of the story. Results show that those with higher moral judgment scores (DIT)
reconstructed significantly more stage 5 reasoning than did those with lower scores.
Moreover, college students recalled significantly more stage 5 than stages 1-4 moral
arguments than the eighth graders. Narveaz et al. (1999) also report that students inferred
reasoning not present in the stories, indicating that the prior knowledge of moral schemas
influenced the recall of the stories.
It is clear that both cognitive and affective perspective taking play a central role in
moral formation and prosocial behavior. Hoffmann’s theory of induction provides an
adequate mechanism for how perspective taking works in the process of moral formation,
building a foundational script or schema upon which subsequent moral action is built.
Using the Narvaez and Lapsley (in press) framework, it is reasonable to expect that
training in perspective taking will make the Transgression–Guilt script that Hoffman
postulates chronically accessible to the moral actor.
A key component in the film curriculum under study here is the use of an
inductive technique following the viewing of the film. After each film clip is shown, the
teacher asks a series of questions concerning the cognitive and affective perspectives of
the characters in the film clip. By such questions as “How do the characters feel in the
situation they are in?” and “What was that character thinking when she said that to him?”
the student is invited to take on the roles of the characters in the film clip, thereby
promoting perspective taking in the students. The curriculum also offers role play as an
additional classroom activity after the film clip discussion if the teacher so chooses.
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Studies of Training in Perspective Taking. There have been numerous studies
into techniques and programs that enhance prosocial behavior (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005).
Some of them use perspective taking as a dependent outcome. Many train perspective
taking through role play but measure other outcomes. One important early study by
Feshbach (1983) evaluated a program intended to reduce aggression and promote
prosocial behavior in the students in a Los Angeles city school district. The children in
the training group showed reduced aggression and a significant increase in incidences of
cooperation, helping, and generosity through training in affect identification and
understanding, role play, and emotional expressiveness. Feshbach (1983) attributed the
gains to the training and reinforcement of a child’s “ability to perceive situations from the
perspective of other people, to discriminate and identify feelings and to express feelings
that he or she may be experiencing” (p. 269).
Another study particularly salient to the present study utilized video-taped skits
instead of role play to train perspective taking (Silvern, Waterman, Sobesky, & Ryan,
1979). The training group viewed seven video-taped skits in which one of the two
characters commits an error in perspective taking. The skits were shown in an order that
demanded increasingly advanced understanding of the motives and affects of the
characters. A discussion lead by a trained leader followed each skit and focused on
identifying the perspective taking error. The children then discussed alternative solutions
to the problem presented in the skit and made their own video-taped skit. This group was
compared to an activity group that performed a number of semi-structured activities
including drawing pictures of what it means to be a good friend, making a group plan and
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rehearsing and video taping a skit. In a t-test of group comparisons, the training group
showed significant improvement in the sophistication of their perspective taking
compared to the activity group and the no-treatment group. Tests showed a similar result
in affective perspective taking for the training group compared to the activity group and
to the no-treatment group. Improvement in the sophistication of perspective taking was
positively correlated with affective perspective taking.
Iannotti (1978) used role taking and role switching in a series of skits to train
perspective taking in a group of 30 kindergarten-aged boys and a group of 30 third-grade
boys drawn from two different schools. In the role-taking condition, the subjects
physically acted out parts or explained what they would do in a situation presented in a
story plus explain the effect of their actions on others. In addition, a trainer asked
questions to elicit role taking. In the role-switching condition, the subjects changed roles
every 5 minutes and experienced at least 5 different roles per session. The trainer then
asked questions about the experience of role switching. The experimental groups at both
schools showed significant growth in perspective taking compared to the control group in
two different perspective-taking measures (Iannotti, 1978). In a study that trained social
perspective taking through role-playing experiences designed to help the subjects
articulate and coordinate relevant perspectives in social situations along with relevant
internal states of the individuals in the situations, Marsh, Serafica, and Barenboim (1980)
found that, while the multivariate analysis showed only an overall trend for group
differences (training vs. control) on the social perspective-taking measure, the training
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may have stabilized preexisting levels of social perspective taking. The test-retest
reliability was significantly higher for the training group (r=.76) than the control (r=.38).
In evaluating a school-based conflict resolution program, Lane-Garon (1998)
discovered that role plays using scripts from naturally occurring conflict on the
playground helped to train perspective taking. Eighty students (41 treatment, 39 control;
32 males, 48 females) in grades 4 to 6 were selected as subjects for this study and
randomly assigned to a treatment group or control group. The treatment group's gain in
perspective taking scores was statistically significant compared to the control. The
author cites the ecologically valid content of the role play (scenarios from real conflicts
from the playground) as a significant factor in the training.
In one of the rare quantitative studies examining the impact of a dramatic-arts
exercise on empathy in children, Kruger, Samuelson, Kapsch, Flanigan, and Harris
(2002) showed that middle school participants in a playwriting program made highly
significant gains in empathy compared to a control group. In that program, the children
spent a large portion of their time learning about character development in playwriting,
including exercises in paying attention to their own emotional experiences and taking the
perspectives of others. The plays that the students wrote were not acted out, and role play
was not part of the program. However, the study’s authors suggest the exercise of
writing from another person’s perspective contributed to the gains in empathy.
Perspective taking, when induced, not only encourages empathy, but also
promotes prosocial behavior. In one study (Oswald, 1996), a group of subjects watched a
video tape of a person talking about the difficulties of adjusting to campus life under
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three conditions: (a) focusing on the feelings of a person (affective perspective taking),
(b) focusing on the thoughts of the person (cognitive perspective taking), and (c) focusing
on the technical aspects of the taped presentation. The subjects were then asked to
volunteer time to help students adjust to campus life. Those in the affective-perspectivetaking condition volunteered over 280% more time to the project than those in the
technically-focused condition, while those in the cognitive-perspective-taking condition
volunteered 60% more time that the technically focused group. However, perspective
taking alone does not promote prosocial action. In a study testing the roles of trait
personal distress and perspective taking in volunteering, Carlo et al. (1999) found that as
trait perspective taking increased, volunteering increased when low levels of personal
distress where present. The presence of high levels of personal distress weakened the
connection. Training in perspective taking is more efficacious when levels of personal
distress are kept low.
The conclusion drawn from the literature, therefore, is that perspective taking can
be trained. Two techniques that seem to work particularly well are role play and
induction. Role play is used as a strategy to teach values and concepts in character
education (Farrell, Meyer, Sullivan, & Kung, 2003; Flay & Allred, 2003) as well as a
technique for practicing prosocial skills and putting values into action (Caplan et al.,
1992; Gottfredson, Jones, & Gore, 2002; Taylor, Liang, Tracy, Williams, & Seigle, 2002;
Twemlow et al., 2001). Role play puts the subject into the situation of the other and
gives the subject a direct experience of the thoughts and emotions one experiences in that
situation. Discussion about the experience of the role play is also an integral part of
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the successful use of role play (Iannotti, 1978; Frey et al., 2000; Marsh et al., 1980). The
discussion portion employs the techniques of Hoffmann’s inductive-discipline approach.
Induction focuses the subject on the feelings of the observed other–whether in a film or in
a role play. Moreover, the research literature shows that when perspective taking is
induced, prosocial behavior increases and anti-social behavior (aggression) decreases
(Gibbs, Arnold, Ahlborn, & Cheesman, 1984).
What is required for an induction to be efficacious is a stimulus that provides an
appropriate emotionally salient experience for the subject. Hoffmann would call this
experience empathic distress (Hoffman, 2000). It must be appropriate because too much
empathic distress can overwhelm the subject and become personal distress (Carlo et al.,
1999; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1995). Some character education programs use stories and
literature for this purpose, helping students to have imaginative experiences of another’s
action and its consequence in order to inform their own moral choices (Flay et al. 2003;
Solomon, Battistich, Watson, Schaps, & Lewis, 2000). Role play can provide an
emotionally salient experience as the actors take on roles in the play situation. Because it
is a “play,” there is enough cognitive distance to make the emotions of the situation
appropriate for the induction of perspective taking. Too much distance is also a
possibility, as any teacher watching a role play devolve into giggles can attest. Many
studies used video tape as a stimulus for empathic distress (e.g., Sagotsky, WoodSchneider, & Konop, 1981). This allows also for an appropriate amount of cognitive
distance and reduces personal distress (a focus on one’s own emotions) and facilitates
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empathic distress (a focus on the other’s emotion) and the possibility for the induction of
perspective taking. A poor quality video-tape, or less than convincing actors can again
provide too much cognitive distance to produce empathic distress. In addition, these
video-taped role plays do not have the same perceptual impact as professional Hollywood
films because they do not employ the techniques of camera position and editing that
mimic our perception of reality (Anderson, 1996). As the Oswald (1996) study shows, a
focus on the technical aspects of the video did not produce the perspective taking
required to motivate prosocial action.
Film as an occasion for perspective taking. Film has an advantage over role play
in providing an emotional stimulus to arouse empathic emotions. When in a role play or
when observing one, the participants are usually acutely aware that they are “playing” a
scene, and not involved in or witnessing what might be called “reality.” Often children,
and especially adolescents, are painfully conscious of themselves in front of others and
the emotions connected with self-consciousness tend to overshadow the emotions of the
characters in the role play. The observers also are aware that their mates are “acting” a
role and that their emotions are contrived. We may disbelieve that the scene we are
witnessing is real or that the emotions are real when viewing a role play or being
involved in one. When viewing film, however, especially films made by professionals,
we suspend disbelief (Messaris, 1994) and perceive the film as real. The techniques of
Hollywood films are designed to lull our perceptual systems into believing that we are
witnessing a real event (Anderson, 1996). In fact, cognitive film theory purports that our
perceptual systems do not distinguish between the light emanating from a screen and the
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light bouncing off the surfaces of objects or between the sound waves coming from a
speaker and the sound waves coming from a voice box or a musical instrument. To our
eyes and ears and the parts of the brain that process the information, it is all just light and
sound waves. Joseph Anderson (1996) states in his book The Reality of an Illusion that
“it is the fact that the perceptual systems go through the same computational procedures
whether confronted with the real world or with synthesized shadows and sounds that
allows for the existence of cinema” (p. 23).
Psychologists have long used film as a stimulus to induce emotion. In doing so,
they have inadvertently demonstrated the contention of cognitive film theorists that the
brain makes little distinction between film and reality. For example, in a study of the
location of different emotions in the brain, the researchers showed subjects a number of
film clips to elicit different emotions (happiness, sadness, disgust). They analyzed both
the facial expressions of the subjects and their EEG’s. The facial expressions were used
to verify the presence of the emotion they were targeting. When the EEG was correlated
in time with the facial criteria it was a reliable indicator of the presence of the experience
of emotion in the subject. The presence of both the facial expression and the electronic
activity in the brain also verify an unspoken assumption of this and many similar studies:
that the emotions stimulated by the viewing of films are the same as those experienced in
“real life” (Tomarken, Davidson, & Hentiques, 1990). In another study designed to
locate emotion in the brain, subjects viewed a series of emotionally charged or neutral
films and rated their emotional reaction to each clip while their brains were scanned using
positron-emmission tomography (PET). Viewing emotive films was associated with

54
increased activity in the amygdala, which correlated with better recollection of the film
clips three weeks later (Lopez, 2001). The amygdala is where emotion is thought to be
processed in the brain. Film, then, affords similar engagement of emotion and cognition
that would come from witnessing a real scene involving choice and consequences.
Moreover, perspective taking and empathy are the very mechanisms that give film
dramatic impact (Zillman, in press).
Film, in contrast to other techniques to teach perspective taking, has the advantage
of allowing for emotional arousal to augment cognitive perspective taking. The students
can examine the emotions involved in the scene because they have more likely felt
emotion from viewing the film. Studies have shown that compared to viewing still
images, viewing moving images has a dramatic impact on the physiological factors (heart
rate, skin conductance) that indicate emotional arousal. Motion also captures and sustains
the attention of the subject to the image (Simons, Detenber, & Roedema, 1999). The
emotional response to film engages students on two levels: (a) promoting emotional
perspective taking and (b) capturing their interest. The emotional response to the film
affords an occasion for the induction of perspective taking similar to the process parents’
use in Hoffmann’s (2000) inductive-discipline technique. Film viewing also allows for
some distance from the direct experience of emotions so that the emotional response can
lead to empathy instead of personal distress. While emotions are stimulated as if
witnessing the scene as reality, there is still an awareness that what is being viewed is an
artifact–a representation of reality. This cognitive distance is illustrated in a line often
stated while watching a thriller: “It’s only a movie.” Such cognitive distance provides a
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better opportunity for the processing of the emotions required for the induction of
perspective taking.
While teachers have certainly used films in classrooms to discuss actions and their
consequences, no systematic study of the use of Hollywood films (i.e., professionally
produced films with superior artistic and technical merit) for character and moral
development has been conducted to date. Hollywood films have been used to help gifted
children cope in school (Hébert & Neumeister, 2002). Films from Hollywood are used in
college-level psychology classes to illustrate such concepts as structural analysis of social
behavior and personality theories with the students successfully understanding the
theoretical concepts and responding favorably to the method of presentation (Paddock,
Terranova, & Giles, 2001). However, no studies of using Hollywood films as a positive
teaching method for character education exist. This is perhaps because it is difficult to
get permission for a systematic use of Hollywood films in published curricula. While it
is not illegal to show portions of films in the classroom, it is against copyright law to
extract clips and reproduce them for distribution. Permission for this type of
reproduction was obtained for the curriculum created for the present study.
Moral Development and Moral Reasoning
Dilemma discussion. There are two critical experiences in the induction
technique: (a) an experience of another’s emotional state and (b) a discussion about what
caused the emotional state of the other. When a parent is training perspective taking and
empathy, the cause of the emotional state of the other is usually the child whom the
parent is training. The Film Clips curriculum simulates the induction technique by: (a)
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giving the student an experience of another’s emotional state through viewing a film clip
and (b) providing an opportunity for the student to consider the cause of the emotional
state of the other in the discussion of the film clip. Where this differs from the childhood
induction experience is that the student has done nothing to cause the emotional state of
the other on the film. Nevertheless, it is instructive to discuss the cause of the emotion of
the character on the screen, especially if the discussion helps the student consider whether
he or she has ever been in a situation similar to the person in the film. While the student
does not experience personal guilt as in Hoffman’s “transgression-guilt” script, the script
may none-the-less be enacted through the analysis of the empathic emotions felt students
in response to the characters on the screen and the consideration by the student of an
experience that was similar to the one depicted on the screen. Moreover, in the
curriculum training, the teachers were instructed to ask what the students might have
done if they found themselves in a similar situation, with the hope of provoking an
imaginative weighing of possible alternatives and potential courses of action similar to
the classic dilemma discussions in the Kohlbergian tradition.
Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) hypothesized that the ideal situation for advancement
in moral reasoning was to be involved in a discussion with another person who reasoned
at a +1 level from one’s own. Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) engaged a group whose
participants expressed reasoning at various levels in a dilemma discussion. The
experimenter then chose the argument that was one stage above the majority of the
participants and supported it, emphasizing its strengths and encouraging participants to
engage it thinking along these lines. This method led to significant increases in Moral
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Maturity scores. In a review of the effectiveness of moral-development interventions
using the plus one strategy using moral dilemma discussions, Enright, Lapsley, Harris,
and Shawver, (2001) found that the vast majority (10 of 13) produced significant gains in
moral reasoning. Those studies that did not attain significance tended to be shorter in
duration. While the plus-one strategy has good support in the literature, other strategies
also have been effective. Walker (1982) found a significant effect on moral reasoning
with exposure to persons who reasoned 2 stages above the subjects, while Berkowitz,
Gibbs, and Broughton, (1980) found the ideal stage differential was at a +1/3. These
studies support the Vygotskian notion of the “zone of proximal development” that posits
children learn best from a person who performs at a level just above the level of the child
(Walker & Taylor, 1991). Walker and Taylor (1991) also found that hypothetical
dilemmas were not predictive of children’s subsequent moral development, but that “reallife” moral dilemmas from the experience of the child had the greatest impact.
From these studies we can draw two conclusions: (a) real-life dilemmas that are
drawn from personal experience are more efficacious for moral development than are
hypothetical dilemmas and (b) there is a “zone of proximal development” in which
dilemma discussions must take place in order for advancement in moral reasoning to
occur. From this we might infer about moral dilemma discussions what Piaget observed
in his early studies of the moral life of children: that peers are the best teachers because
peers provide the best content and context for moral dilemma discussions. In an
investigation of strategies for interpersonal negotiation, Selman, Beardslee, Schultz,
Krupa, and Podorefsky (1986), discovered that the adolescents who participated in the
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study showed significantly higher reasoning levels in dilemmas in which peers were the
protagonist vs. an adult protagonist and in dilemmas involving personal rather than work
situations. Along similar lines, Kruger (1992) discovered, in her investigation of moraldilemma discussions of young girls (M age =8.6 years) both with their peers and with
their mothers, that peer discussions of moral dilemmas resulted in greater improvement in
moral reasoning than did discussions between children and adults. Kruger (1993) reasons
that the greater symmetry of knowledge and power in the peer dyads compared to the
adult/child dyads produced the freedom to entertain multiple perspectives resulting in
measurable development in moral reasoning.
It is this last point of the effect of symmetry, power, and freedom in moral
discussions that is most salient to the Film Clips curriculum. The moral message is
delivered in a medium that is democratic, that is, it does not come from an authority (such
as the teacher) but from a common experience of viewing a film clip providing symmetry
in power and knowledge not only with peers, but with the teacher as well. One could
argue that because films and other visual media are preferred forms of communication for
young people they feel superior in knowledge to the teacher at times. Discussing the
conflict or dilemma inherent in each scene with each other allows for the opportunity for
effective growth in moral reasoning through two proven techniques: peer to peer
discussion and conflicts and dilemmas that are true to life.
Gibbs et al.(1984) used dilemma discussion to affect growth in moral reasoning
with juvenile delinquents. In their study they groups participants in their modal stage of
reasoning. 87.5% of those pretested at modal stage 2 shifted to modal stage 3 after
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participating in moral dilemma discussions, whereas only 14.3% of the control group at
modal stage 2 made the shift to stage 3 at posttest. They view a moral stage as essentially
a cognitive schema “that influences an individual’s selection, anticipation, interpretation
and evaluation of a situational event” (p. 38). Thus growth in moral reasoning involves a
shift in the cognitive schema that governs moral deliberation and action.
The Film Clips curriculum promotes perspective taking through the cognitive
processing of empathic-emotional stimulation induced by viewing film clips containing
examples of moral conflict and character traits. The processing occurs through teacherled group discussion with a focus on the emotional impact of the actions of the characters
in the film clips. Moreover, the discussion of the moral conflict in the film promotes
advancement in moral reasoning through exposure to higher-staged reasoning in the peerto-peer exchange of ideas. In addition, the curriculum supplements the film clips with
activities such as games and role plays that reinforce the themes in the clips and further
develop the skills needed for prosocial development. In the present study, subjects in two
after-school programs in the state of Georgia were randomly assigned to participate either
in a program using the Film Clips Curriculum (treatment) or a standard after-school
program (control). Both groups were tested prior to the experimental group beginning
the curriculum. Both groups were tested again when the experimental group finished the
curriculum (9 sessions). The averred effect of the curriculum leads to three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.

Given the theoretical considerations for how empathy and

perspective taking are trained through the cognitive processing of emotionally salient
social situations outlined above (Hoffman, 2000) and how the viewing of film clips
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affords an occasion for an emotionally stimulating experience along with the processing
of that experience through classroom discussion, and with the demonstration in the
literature that similar techniques (role play, video training) have been successful in
training cognitive and affective perspective taking, I expected to see an increase in total
empathy, cognitive perspective taking, and empathic concern in the treatment group
versus the control group as measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis,
1983).
Hypothesis 2. Given the theoretical and research-supported connection between
the influence of training and improving skills in perspective taking, empathy, and moral
reasoning on prosocial attitudes and behavior outlined above, and the increase in
perspective taking expected from the Film Clips curriculum, I further expected that the
experimental group would demonstrate greater gains in concern for others compared to
the control group as measured by the Concern for Others Scale (Solomon et al. 2000).
Hypothesis 3.

Finally, given the role that schemas and scripts play in guiding

moral thought and behavior outlined above (Lapsley & Narvaez, in press; Rest et
al.,1999a) and how the experience of viewing and discussing film clips mimics the
schema for perspective taking trained in early childhood through inductive discipline
(Hoffman, 2000), I expected the experimental group to demonstrate an improved ability
to recognize moral themes in stories more efficiently as measured by the Moral Theme
Inventory (MTI, Narvaez et al., 1999). Furthermore, given the theoretical and researchsupported connection between dilemma discussions and gains in moral reasoning
outlined above, I expected the experimental group to demonstrate greater gains in moral
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reasoning (reasoning at higher moral stages) than the control group as measured by the
Moral Theme Inventory (Narvaez et al., 1999).
Method
Participants
The study began with 345 participants enrolled in 21st Century Community
Learning Centers Programs in two rural, county-wide school districts, one in north
Georgia, another in west Georgia. Congress established the 21st Century Community
Learning Centers Program as part of the No Child Left Behind Act (2002) awarding
grants to rural and inner-city public schools to provide academic support as well as
various enrichment activities, including drug and violence prevention and character
education. The state of Georgia made the Film Clips curriculum a regular part of the
enrichment activities in the state’s 21st Century Community Learning Centers.
The participants in both counties were randomly assigned a number and then
placed into one of two groups: even-numbered participants received the program as part
of their after-school enrichment activities (treatment), while odd-numbered participants
engaged in activities typical of their after school program such as homework help, arts
and crafts, board and card games, and outside activities during the same period (control).
The teachers sent permission slips home with all the students. Only those who assented
and those whose parents consented to their children’s participation in the research project
were pretested (Northern County, n = 52; Western County, n = 293).
Due to factors beyond the researcher’s control, each county implemented the
program differently. The Northern County treatment group (n = 19) had two mixed-grade
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classes (grades 3 through 6) with one teacher in each class. The treatment group received
the Film Clips program 1 hour per week for 9 weeks (hereafter called the 9-week
condition). The Western County treatment group (n = 150) had five separate classes, one
for each grade (grades 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), with two teachers per class.

The treatment

participants received the program 3 separate hours per week for 3 weeks (hereafter called
the 3-week condition). Each treatment group received all 9 sessions of the program.
The counties differed in the attrition of participants from pretest to posttest. In the
9-week condition, 6 treatment and 17 control participants did not take the posttest due to
leaving the program or being absent on the day the test was administered. This resulted
in collected data from 29 participants (13 treatment and 16 control). There were no
significant differences in the pretest reading comprehension scores collected as part of the
Moral Theme Inventory (Narvaez et al. 1999) between the attrition group (n = 23) and the
remaining sample (n = 29). Because I collected the participant age data at posttest, no
means testing for age differences between the attrition sample and remaining sample
could be performed.
The 3-week condition treatment program period fell near the end of the school
year. This did not leave the teachers time to give the posttest to the original pretested
sample. However, a subset of the original sample attended a special summer school
session to help them pass the Criterion Reference Tests (CRT) necessary to enter the next
grade (n = 77 or 26% of the original sample; treatment = 46, control = 31). This group
took the posttest at the beginning of the summer school session. It must be noted,
however, that because this group required further schooling for promotion to the next
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grade, it no longer represents the general population of the students in the 3-week
condition county, but consists of students with particular academic challenges.
Compared to their counterparts who did not take the posttest (n= 216), the summer school
group who took both pretest and posttest (n= 77) had significantly lower reading
comprehension scores at pretest (t (291) = 2.23, p = .026). As in the 9-week condition, I
collected the participant age data at posttest; therefore, no means testing for age
differences could be performed.
The participants completed the pretest measures in one sitting in both conditions
in the following order: The Moral Theme Inventory (MTI), the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (IRI), and the Concern for Others Scale (COS). The posttesting procedure was
identical to the pretesting procedure. In the two counties combined, 106 participants (59
treatment, 47 control) were tested at both time points. All 106 were able to complete the
MTI each time. However, 14 participants (8 treatment, 6 control) did not complete the
entire battery at some point (either pretest, posttest, or both). Therefore, the MTI data
reported below are based on a sample of 106; The IRI and COS data are based on a
sample of 92 (51 treatment, 41 control). Table 1 in the Results section shows the
breakdown of the sample into relevant groups.
Design and Procedure
Description of program treatment. The Film Clips for Character Education
program consists of 9 discrete sessions, each based on a character trait chosen from a list
of 27 character traits mandated by the Core Curriculum of the State of Georgia
(www.glc.k12.ga.us/qcc). The session themes are as follows (presented in this order):
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Honesty, Cooperation, Respect, Good Sportsmanship, Kindness, Self-control, Courage,
Loyalty, and Perseverance. For each session, four film clips from popular films produced
by major Hollywood studios are available for viewing on a DVD. For example, on the
theme of Honesty, the choices are film clips from Liar, Liar (Grazer & Shadyac, 1997),
Cool Runnings (Steel & Turteltaub,1997), Shrek (Katzenberg et al., 2001), and
Pinocchio (Disney, Sharpsteen, & Luske, 1940). No film has more than a PG13 rating,
and no clip has any content that would garner more than a PG rating.
Three criteria guided the choice of the film clips: (a) how well the clips illustrated
the session’s theme character trait, (b) the appropriateness for a young audience, and (c) a
presentation of a moral conflict, where possible. The choices for the theme of honesty
demonstrate these principles. Pinocchio (Disney, Sharpsteen, & Luske, 1940) is a classic
story on the virtue of honesty and the consequences of dishonesty that has long delighted
children. In the clip, Pinocchio lies to the good fairy about why he did not go to school.
As the lie “grows and grows” so does his nose. The fairy gives an explicit lesson on how
a lie can grow until “it is as plain as the nose on your face.” The dilemma for Pinocchio
is to continue to lie to avoid punishment, or to “come clean,” as Jiminy Cricket says, and
face the consequences. In the clip from Cool Runnings (Steel & Turteltaub,1997), a
popular comedy starting the late John Candy, the coach (Candy) explains to one of the
players on his Jamaican Bobsled team how he felt he had to cheat and lie to preserve his
status as a winner. His dilemma was to lie and save face or to tell the truth and to loose
the regard of those around him. In the animated film Shrek (Katzenberg, Warner,
Williams, Adamson, Jenson, & Marshall, 2001) a film popular with children of all ages,
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the princess implores her friend the donkey not to tell Shrek the truth that she turns into
an ogre at sunset, and that only the kiss from her true love will break the spell. The
dilemma is to tell the truth and risk Shrek’s friendship, or to lie and preserve it. The film
Liar, Liar (Grazer & Shadyac, 1997) has a global R-rating but the clip from the film was
appropriate for children and fit our criteria exactly. In the scene, a father is telling his
young son to undo a wish the son made for his birthday that his father would tell the truth
for 24 hours. The father explains how he needs to lie to preserve his job. He presented a
dilemma to his son that is especially challenging to young people of late grade school and
junior high age: should the boy obey an authority (his father) and undo the wish (even
though he knows lying is wrong), or should he disobey his father and do what he feels is
right? Film clips such as the one from Liar, Liar (Grazer & Shadyac, 1997) that present
the students with a choice between two “goods” (obeying an authority vs. insisting in the
truth) are ideal for the type of dilemma discussion the curriculum endeavors to promote.
In the same manner, the activities suggested in the curriculum are designed to
give the student an experience either a direct experience of practicing the character trait
in question or an experience of making a choice between two conflicting goods. The
activity choices for Honesty include telling three things about oneself to the group, one
true and two false. The group tries to guess the false statements. A discussion on the
experience of the game concludes the activity. Another suggested activity is a game
sometimes known as “Dictionary,” which actually rewards the player who can make up
the most convincing false definition of an little known word. The activities always
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included the options of journal writing on the theme in question and a role play that
reinforce the theme.
The curriculum does not prescribe a set order of events for each session but gives
the teachers a number of options to design the session as they see fit. The two
components that are fixed are the viewing of the film clip and the discussion which
follows the viewing. In a typical session (as presented in the program training) a teacher
introduces the theme of the day and perhaps asks some preliminary questions of
definition (e.g., What is honesty? How do you show honesty?). The teacher would have
chosen one or two of the four possible clips to show the class as illustrations of the theme
character trait. A discussion follows the showing of each clip with a particular focus on
the feelings of the characters involved (e.g., How did the boy feel when his father lied to
him all the time?) and the feelings of the students (e.g., How do you feel when you are
lied to?).
Training in the curriculum consisted of 2 sessions: one with all of the teachers in
the 3-week program and the supervisor from the 9-week program and another with 3 of
the 5 teachers in the 9-week program. The remaining teachers in the 9-week program
were trained by their supervisor, who was included in the original training. In each
training session I emphasized the two foci of the curriculum: (a) the use of the film clip
as an example of a character trait (direct teaching) and (b) the importance of the
discussion of the situation of the character in the film clip (dilemma discussion). After
showing a sample film clip, I demonstrated how the film clip can be used to help the
children understand the meaning of the character trait in question. Then I led the teachers
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in a mock discussion, emphasizing the importance of identifying the feelings of the
characters in the film as well as the feelings of the students as they watched the film. I
turned the discussion to the situation in the film and the choices the characters made and
asked the teachers to help their students discuss if the characters had made good choices.
I also encouraged the teachers to lead the students to discuss experiences in their lives
similar to those demonstrated in the film. I then demonstrated how, after the showing of
one or two clips and the subsequent discussion, the teacher could then choose from a
number of suggested follow-up activities including games, role-play, art projects, video
taping, research, and cooperative projects by working through some examples.
An informal telephone survey with five of the seven teachers (two from the 9week condition, three from the 3-week condition) revealed these commonalities in
implementation:
1) The sessions lasted typically between 45 minutes and 1 hour.
2) The focus of the sessions was the film clips. The teachers used a minimum of two
clips per session, often using all four clips, stopping for discussion after each clip.
3) The discussions were teacher-led. The students responded to direct questioning of
the teachers. The teachers noted that it was easy to get the children to talk.
4) The teachers focused their questions on the feelings of the characters and asked
how the children might feel under similar conditions. The children often
responded with examples of their own experience as it related to the scene.
5) The teachers reported that they did not have time for many follow-up activities, if
any at all.
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6) All nine sessions of the program were completed in both conditions.
Instruments
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). The IRI is designed to assess
four distinct aspects of empathy: Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, Fantasy, and
Personal Distress. The measure is a 28- item self-report questionnaire consisting of four
7-item subscales, each corresponding to these specific aspects of empathy. The
Perspective Taking scale measures the capacity to take another’s point of view in
everyday life. A sample from the Perspective Taking scale is “I sometimes try to
understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.” The
Fantasy scale measures the tendency to get into the feelings and actions of fictitious
characters when reading books, or viewing movies and plays. A sample item from this
scale is “I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.” The
Empathic Concern scale measures the tendency when interacting with others to
experience feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern. A typical item from this scale
is “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.” The
Personal Distress scale measures the tendency when confronted with the emotions of
others to focus on one’s own feelings of personal unease and discomfort. An item from
this scale is “Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.” The scores from the
Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, and Fantasy Scales are combined to give a total
empathy score (Davis, 1983). I will use the total empathy score in this study because it
focuses on the self-reported empathic response of the subjects to another person (whether
actual or fictional), leaving out the self-focused empathic response (personal distress).
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The total empathy score is the score usually reported in the literature when measuring
empathy.
Davis (1983) reports that all four scales have satisfactory internal reliability (from
.71 - .77) and test-retest reliability (.62 - .71). Females score higher on all four subscales.
The subscales show the following significant inter-correlations: Empathic Concern
positively correlates with Perspective Taking (r = .33) and Fantasy Scale (r = .33).
Perspective Taking and Personal Distress have a negative correlation (r = -.23). Davis
compared his scale to other extant empathy measures. He reported that the Perspective
Taking scale significantly correlates with the more cognitively oriented Hogan Empathy
Scale (r = .40) while the Fantasy and Empathic Concern scales significantly correlate
with the more affectively oriented Mehrabian and Epstein Emotional Empathy Scale (r =
.52 and .62, respectively). In contrast, Perspective Taking showed lower correlations
with the Mehrabian and Epstein Scale (r = .20) and the Fantasy and Empathic Concern
scales had much lower correlations with the Hogan Empathy scale. This indicates that
while the IRI presents multiple dimensions of empathy, the Perspective Taking scale
seems to measure cognitive perspective taking while the Fantasy and Empathic Concern
scales measure affective perspective taking. Davis (1983) confirmed the cognitive focus
of the Perspective Taking scale and the affective focus of the Empathic Concern scale
through further experiments. Eisenberg et al (1991) demonstrated that Perspective
Taking scores increase with age.
The Concern for Others Scale (COS). The Concern for Others scale (Solomon et
al., 2000) is a prosocial attitudes, self-report instrument. It was originally developed in
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the early 1990’s by the Developmental Studies Center of Oakland, California to assess
the impact of the Child Development Project program on the prosocial attitudes of the
California public school children. The program utilized student collaboration, a
literature-based approach to reading, and a student-centered approach to classroom
management, along with role play, games, and other interactive learning techniques. This
program has proven successful on many outcomes, including intrinsic and extrinsic
prosocial motivation, altruistic attitudes, and concern for others. Solomon et al. (2000)
developed many instruments geared toward late grade school aged children (grades 3-6)
to assess the outcomes of this program including the Concern for Others Scale. The scale
has internal consistencies measured by Chronbach’s alpha ranging from .74 to .81.
The Moral Theme Inventory (MTI; Narvaez et al. 1999). The MTI uses moral
stories to assess the ability of the subject to recognize moral themes in real-life situations
and to reason about these stories by recognizing similar stories and choosing a correct
summary statement of the stories. The measure consists of 4 stories about moral
dilemmas. Each story has a complex moral message and contains a dilemma that the
protagonist in the story resolves. The protagonist solves the dilemma in the story by
making a choice guided by the values affirmed in the theme of the story. The four stories
are titled after their protagonists: “Kim,” “California,” “Jed” and “Malcolm.” In “Kim”
the theme is honesty and the values affirmed are being honest with everyone, even
strangers, and using self-control to be honest (Kim receives too much change from a
cashier). The story of “California” is a modern version of the Hans Christian Andersen
story, “The Boy and the Dike.” Its theme is caring, and it asserts the values of self-
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sacrifice and perseverance to help others. The theme of “Jed” is being true to your word,
and it demonstrates the values of trustworthiness and doing one’s duty. “Malcolm”
presents the theme of a conflict of loyalty. It asserts the value of telling the truth to
strangers even at great costs.
The sequencing of the tasks is as follows, repeated for each story. The students
read along with an audio-taped version of the story and then answer10 true/false
statements to test reading comprehension. They then complete four tasks measuring
moral theme comprehension related to the story:
1) Vignette rating: The first of four vignettes (paragraph-long stories with the same
or different theme) is read out loud on audio-tape, and the participant makes a
rating before the reading of the next vignette. Participants rate the vignette
according to how closely it matches the original story’s theme using a 5-point
Likert-type scale. This process is repeated for all four vignettes. One of the four
vignettes is the target vignette (correct response). It has different actions and
different actors but the same moral theme as the story. The three distractor*
(incorrect) vignettes vary systematically on so called “superficial characteristics,”
(i.e., character, action and setting). One uses the same action but different actors,
another uses the same actors but different actions, a third uses the same setting
only.

* Distractor is a technical term used by Narvaez et al. in their 1999 study that reflects the
intentional design of the statement to “distract” the subject from the correct response.
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2) Vignette choice: Participants select the one vignette of the four presented that best
matches the theme of the original story.
3) Message rating: In this section, seven (or eight) short statements relating to the
moral theme of the story are read aloud. After each is read, participants rate each
of seven or eight messages according to how well each matches the theme of the
original story using a 5 point Likert-type scale. There are two correct messages
that reflect the moral theme of the story.
The five remaining messages are labeled distractor messages. They are intended
to distract the subject from giving the two correct messages the highest rating, and
also from later choosing them as reflective of the story’s moral theme. The theory
is that those who are more practiced at moral reasoning will ignore the distractors
and make the correct choice. The five distractor types are:
A) Stage1 theme distortion (a focus on reprisal). The theme of this message
statement is that the protagonist did the right thing out of fear of punishment.
This and the next two distractor types are based on Rest’s version of Kohlberg’s
moral judgment stages 1-3 (Rest et al. 1999a).
B) Stage 2 theme distortion (a focus on personal gain or loss). The theme
of this message statement is that the protagonist acted out of self-interest.
C) Stage 3 theme distortion (a focus on gaining or loosing approval of others).
The theme of this message statement is that protagonist receives from others
praise for doing the right thing or scorn for doing the wrong thing.
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D) An item that focused on the priority of the “in-group” (collectivism). The
theme of this message is that the protagonist chooses the action that will benefit
those to whom he or she is closest; and
E) An item using multi-syllabic, “grown-up” words.
4) Message choices. Participants select two choices that best match the theme of the
original story.
The scores for each task are derived in the following way. This procedure is
repeated for the four moral stories.
A) Vignette Rating [VR]: The difference between the participant’s Likert-type
rating on each incorrect vignette and his/her rating of the correct vignette is calculated,
and then these differences are added together. For example, if a subject rated the correct
vignette a 4, and rated the incorrect vignettes a 3, a 1, and a 5 respectively, the [VR] score
would be (4 – 3) + (4 – 1) + (4 – 5) = 3.
B) Vignette Choice [VC]: The credit for the correct vignette choice is 1 point; an
incorrect choice is 0.
C) Message Rating [MR]: First, the ratings of the two correct messages are
averaged. Then the difference between each of the ratings for the distractor (incorrect)
items and the average of the two correct theme choices is calculated, and these
differences are summed. For example, if the subject rated the correct theme messages a 3
and a 5, respectively, the average of 3 and 5 is 4. The rating of each distractor (incorrect)
message is subtracted from 4. If those ratings were 2, 1, 4, 3 and 1, the subsequent [MR]
score would be (4 - 2) + (4 - 1) + (4 - 4) + (4 - 3) + (4 - 1) = 9.
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D) Message Choice [MC]: Since there are two correct theme choices from seven
possible messages, the score for this section can be 2 (both correct messages chosen), 1
(one correct choice) or 0 (no choices correct).
The four scores are then added together for a comprehensive score ([VR] + [VC]
+ [MR] +. [MC] = [CS]) for each moral story. In the original study (Narvaez et al.,
1999), the scores for each of these four combination variables for each of the four stories
were added together for a composite moral comprehension theme score and the reliability
of the composite score (across four stories and four tasks) using Cronbach’s alpha is .89.
In the present study, I used two stories at pretest (“Kim” and “California”), and I
combined the scores generated from the responses to the two stories to form the pretest
comprehensive score. I used the two remaining stories at posttest (“Jed” and “Malcolm”)
and combined the scores generated to form the posttest comprehensive score. This is the
first time this measure has been used in a pretest/posttest format to evaluate a program.
Since the stories were read via audiotape to the subjects at one sitting, they were not
counterbalanced.
In the statistical analysis, I summed the ten true/false questions from each of the
four stories that measured reading comprehension to create a total reading comprehension
score. This score, derived from a total of 40 questions, is used as a covariate in many of
the statistical analyses of this study. I used this same score to compare the samples for
compatibility. These questions contained both true and false facts and true and false
inferences. The expectation is that a good reader would make the true inferences given
the causal supporting evidence in the story. Over all 4 stories in the true/false section
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there are 12 true facts, 11 false facts, 7 true inferences and 10 false inferences randomly
ordered for each story. Cronbach’s alpha for these 40 questions is .81. (Narvaez et al.
1999).
Narvaez et al. (1999) found significant differences in the performance on the MTI
by age, even after controlling for reading comprehension. That is, with increasing age,
(3rd grade, 5th grade, and adult) correct performance improved. Moreover, younger
participants are more attracted to distractors at lower stage moral reasoning than their
older counterparts, leading the researchers to conclude that moral judgment development
impacts moral theme comprehension.
Moral Stage Attraction. The total comprehensive score of the MTI includes the
totals of four separate sections (VR, VC, MR, MC) as outlined above. The third section
(the Message Rating section) requires the participant to choose two statements from a
series of seven (or eight) statements that best describe the point of the story. Among
those seven statements are the two correct choices and five distractor choices:
1-3) Three statements that echo the theme of the story in terms of Rest’s version
of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stages (stages 1-3);
4) A statement that reflects the priority of the “in-group” (collectivism), and
5) A nonsense statement using multi-syllabic words.
The three statements based on Rest’s version of Kohlberg’s first three moral
judgment stages recast the moral of the stimulus story with the following distortions:
Stage 1: a focus on punishment as a motive for doing the right thing (avoiding the
wrong); Stage 2: a focus on how right action results in personal gain; and, Stage 3: a
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focus on how right action will gain or loose the approval of others. The participant
attained the maximum score for this section if he or she rated the two correct theme
choices at a five (on a 1 to 5 Lickert-type scale) and all other statements (the
“distractors”) a one. However, this scoring is not sensitive to any change in moral
reasoning levels. For example, the participant attracted to Stage 3 distractors (indicated
by giving them the highest rating [5]) is penalized the same amount as the participant
who rated the Stage 1 distractors at the highest level. Moreover, it is possible that the
relative attraction to the various stage distractor statements could change due to the
intervention. Thus, a treatment subject who was attracted to Stage 1 distractor statements
at pretest, could be more attracted to Stage 2 or 3 distractor statements following the
intervention, reflecting the beginning of growth in moral reasoning. Yet that participant
would not necessarily post an increase in the overall MTI comprehensive score.
For the purposes of looking at micro changes in moral reasoning, an alternative
scoring procedure was used. In the Message Rating section of the MTI, the ratings of the
three distractor statements based on Rest’s version of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stages
(Stages 1-3, Rest et al., 1999a) were separated from the rest of the data. The ratings of
these three statements are chosen because they were based explicitly on Kohlberg’s moral
judgment stages, and the moral reasoning stage of the participants is most likely to
fallwithin the parameters of the first three stages due to their age (Narvaez et al., 1999;
Rest et al., 1999a). In order to differentiate the attraction of the participant to each
statement and each moral judgment stage, I weighted the value from the Likert-type scale
assigned by the participant to the various moral stage distractors to reflect the stage of
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reasoning of the distractor statement. Thus, I multiplied the value assigned by the
participant to the Stage 1 distractor by 1, the value of the Stage 2 distractor by 2 and the
value of the Stage 3 distractor by 3. I then added these three weighted values together to
obtain a total weighted stage score for both pre-test and post-test. For example, if a
participant gave the Stage 1 distractor statement a rating of 4, the Stage 2 distractor a
rating of 2 and the stage 3 distractor a rating of 1 at pretest, the pretest Moral Stage
Attraction for that story would be 11 ((4x1) + (2x2) + (1x3) = 4 + 4 + 3 =11). The two
weighted scores for each pretest story were added to obtain a total pretest Moral Stage
Attraction score. The posttest Moral Stage Attraction score is the total weighted ratings
from the two posttest stories. The resulting continuous variables allow for a comparison
of participants relative to the level of moral reasoning to which they are attracted. A high
score means the participants were attracted to statements that reflected higher levels of
moral reasoning (a rating of 2 on the statement reflecting Stage 3 reasoning scores higher
(2x3=6) than the highest rating on the Stage 1 statement (5x1=5)), whereas a low score
means participants were more attracted to lower stages and less attracted to higher stages
of moral reasoning reflected in various distractor statements. A comparative analysis of
the total Moral Stage Attraction will comprise part of the overall data analysis.
The ratings of the Stage 1, 2, and 3 distractor messages also can be of use to
assess whether subjects are in a consolidation or transition phase in their moral reasoning
(Thoma & Rest, 1999, Walker et al., 2001). While the ratings of the distractor messages
do not give a researcher the precise modal stage at which the participant is reasoning,
they do give an indication of the stage of moral reasoning that the participant thinks is the
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most sensible to explain the actions of the protagonists in the story. So, while a
participant may not be able to generate reasoning at Stage 3 in a Moral Judgment
Interview (MJI, Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) for example, that participant shows an
attraction to the reasoning of stage 3 by giving a high rating to the Stage 3 distractor.
From the discussion of the consolidation/transition model in moral reasoning
development above, Walker et al., 2001 showed that the direction of bias is a powerful
predictor of one’s moral stage transition. A person showing a positive bias (i.e., attracted
to reasoning more above his or her current modal stage of moral reasoning than below), is
thought to be in the transition phase, while a person in a consolidation phase has a
propensity to be attracted to reasoning more at or below his or her modal stage of moral
reasoning than above.
The Moral Theme Inventory (MTI), like the DIT, uses tacit recognition of
representative statements of various stages of moral reasoning rather than asking test
subjects to articulate their own justifications for moral positions and scoring those
responses according to their moral stage as in the MJI (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Rest,
et al, (1999a, 1999b) defend the use of recognition of moral stage reasoning in the DIT
versus the production moral reasoning in the MJI as an equally valid form of measuring
stage of moral reasoning with the additional advantage of measuring the implicit moral
understanding of an individual perhaps beyond the individual’s capacity to consciously
produce in an interview. However, in contrast to the DIT and the MJI, the MTI does not
ask test subjects to solve a moral dilemma, but only to recognize a moral theme in a
story. The moral theme of the story that the student must recognize is restated

79
in the universal terms implied in the story (the correct response) and also in terms that
reflect stages 1-3 of Kohlberg’s moral stages (as well as in “in-group” language and in a
nonsensical, large word sentence). The premise of the test is that those who operate out
of a higher stage moral schema would recognize the universal application of the moral of
the story whereas those who operate out of lower stage moral schemas would be
“distracted” by the restatements of the story theme reflecting Kohlberg’s stages 1-3.
Results
Due to the significant attrition rate, I had interest in combining the participant
groups from the two counties to increase sample size for hypothesis testing. To explore
that possibility, testing for between-county differences was necessary, especially given
county-specific variation in student characteristics and form of implementation. To be
conservative, I conducted these analyses on the smaller sample (n=91) with complete
data records. (See Table 1 for means.) There is a significant difference in age between
the 9-week condition and the 3-week condition treatment groups (t(48) = 2.19, p <.05).
There is a significant difference between the 9-week condition and the 3-week condition
control groups in age (t(39) = 2.65 p < .05) and in reading comprehension (t(39) = -4.29
p < .01). These differences in student characteristics and the implementation differences
preclude combining either the treatment or the control groups from the two counties. I
also conducted an investigation between the treatment and control groups within each
county. There are no significant differences in age or reading comprehension between the
3-week condition treatment and control groups. In the 9-week condition there are
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significant differences in both age (t (23) = -2.58, p < .05) and reading comprehension (t
(23) = 2.37, p < .05) between the control and treatment groups.
Table 1
Between-Condition Comparisons of the Population Characteristics of Treatment and
Control Groups
3-week condition (low achievers)
Completed All Measures

Completed MTI

Characteristic

Treatment

Control

Treatment

Control

Total N

38

29

46

31

n males

24

13

27

15

M age

12.6*

11.7**

12.3

11.6**

Age Range

9 – 16

8 – 15

8 – 16

8 – 15

M reading comprehension

15.22

13.94**

15.19

14.16*

9-week condition (average achievers)
Completed All Measures

Completed MTI

Characteristic

Treatment

Control

Treatment

Control

Total N

12

13

13

16

n males

9

8

9

9

M age

11.3*

10.2**

11.5

10.2**

Age Range

10 – 12

9 – 12

10 – 12

9 – 12

M reading comprehension

16.29

17.96**

16.5

17.81*

* p < .05, ** p < .01; Indicates significant differences by group between conditions.
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Therefore, the analysis will proceed in three sections:, First, I will test the effect
of the intervention by comparing the treatment and control groups in the 3-week
condition. Second, I will conduct another test of the effect of the intervention by
comparing the treatment and control groups of the 9-week condition, controlling for their
differences in age and reading comprehension. Third, since the unplanned difference in
implementation allows a chance to compare the efficacy of delivering the treatment in
either a 3-week period or a 9-week period, I will conduct a post-hoc comparison of the
treatment groups from each condition to test the effect of the difference in
implementation, controlling for their differences in age. Within each of the three sections
seven outcomes will be reported.
1) Total score from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)
2) Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI
3) Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI
4) Fantasy subscale of the IRI
5) Total Concern for Others (COS) score
6) Comprehensive score of the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI) and
7) Total Moral Stage Attraction score
Of the many statistical methods used to evaluate treatment effects on two groups
in a pretest – treatment – posttest design, the ANCOVA provides the greatest power and
likelihood of finding a significant difference between groups (Stevens, 2001), by using
the posttest as the dependant variable and the pretest as (one of) the covariate(s). The
assumptions of the ANCOVA require the covariate(s) to have a linear relationship with
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the dependent variable and the regression slopes be equal within each group (no group x
covariate interaction). When the pretest regression slopes for each group prove to be
unequal, I use a two-way, repeated-measure ANOVA (or ANCOVA) with one between
factor and one within factor. The between group factor was either group membership in
the treatment group between the counties or group membership within each county. The
within factor was always the pretest and posttest of the measure under analysis. In the
cases where the repeated-measure analysis required a covariate, (a repeated-measure
ANCOVA), the covariate used always conformed to ANCOVA assumptions. The stricter
Greenhouse-Geisser statistic was used to control for sphericity in all ANCOVAs or
ANOVAs that have within-subjects factors.
Within-3-week Condition Comparison of Control and Treatment Groups
IRI total empathy score. For the subjects from the 3-week condition who
completed all the measures (treatment n = 39, control n=28), an independent t-test
comparing the mean age and reading comprehension scores of the treatment and control
groups shows no significant differences. The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,63) = 10.40, p < .001). A
two-way ANOVA with one between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor
(Total Empathy score at pretest and posttest) was therefore conducted. No significant
main effect for time of measure or group x time of measure interaction is found.
IRI Empathic Concern (EC) score. The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,63) = 3.70, p < .05),
meaning the assumptions were not met. Therefore, a two-way ANOVA with one
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between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (EC score at pretest and
posttest) was conducted. The results indicate no significant main effect for time of
measure or group x time of measure interaction.
IRI Perspective Taking (PT) score. The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,63) = 4.69, p < .05), and
the necessary assumptions were not met. Therefore, a two-way ANOVA with one
between factor (treatment and control groups) and one within factor (PT score at pretest
and posttest) was conducted. The results indicate no significant main effect for time of
measure or group x time of measure interaction.
IRI Fantasy Scale (FS) score. The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,63) = 3.78, p < .05). A
two-way ANOVA with one between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (FS
score at pretest and posttest) was therefore conducted. The results indicate no significant
main effect for time of measure or group x time of measure interaction.
Concern for Others Scale (COS). The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a
significant group (treatment, control) x pretest interaction (F (2,62) = 9.31, p < .001),
meaning the assumptions were not met. Therefore, a two-way ANOVA with one
between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (COS score at pretest and
posttest) was conducted. The results indicate no significant main effect for time of
measure or group x time of measure interaction.
MTI Comprehensive Score. The 31 control subjects and 46 treatment subjects
from the 3-week condition who completed both pre- and posttest of the MTI (N = 77)
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showed no significant differences in reading comprehension score or age allowing the
consideration of an ANCOVA analysis with pretest as the covariate. However, as stated
above, it is suggested that the reading comprehension score also be used as a covariate in
the analysis. The test of ANCOVA assumptions results a significant group (treatment,
control) x reading comprehension score interaction precluding the use of that variable as
a covariate (F (2,54) = 3.60, p < .05). Again, as in the previous comparison of the
treatment groups, since the assumptions with the pre-MTI comprehensive score were met
(no significant group x pre-MTI comprehensive score interaction) and the reading
comprehension score and the pre-MTI comprehensive score significantly correlate (r =
.420, p < .001), we can get a meaningful analysis by using just the pre-MTI
comprehensive score as a covariate. Thus, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted with
theMTI comprehensive score at posttest as the dependent variable, the pre-MTI
comprehensive score as covariate and the two within-county groups (treatment, control)
as fixed factors. Results indicate no significant difference in the means of the two
groups.
The Moral Stage Attraction Score. The Message Rating section of the MTI asks
the participant to rate a series of message statements according to how well the statement
reflects the “best meaning” of the story. Of the seven messages statements, two are
correct choices and five are distractor (incorrect) choices. Three of these distractors are
based on Rest’s version of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stages (Stages 1-3). To assess the
change in attraction to higher stage reasoning from pre- to posttest between groups, the
value each participant had assigned to the various moral stage distractors was weighted to
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reflect the stage of reasoning related to the distractor statement. Thus, the Likert-type
scale value assigned to the Stage 1 distractor was multiplied by 1, the value of the Stage 2
distractor multiplied by 2, and the value of the Stage 3 distractor multiplied by three.
These three weighted values were then added together to obtain a Moral Stage Attraction
score for each story. The scores associated with the four stories were summed to yield a
Total Moral Stage Attraction score, one for pretest and one for posttest. (See Instruments
section above.)
An analysis that includes between subject and within subject comparisons is
preferable to one that focuses on means testing between groups such as an ANCOVA in
testing for differences between groups on the Moral Stage Attraction Score. Therefore, a
two-way ANOVA with one between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (the
Moral Stage Attraction score at pretest and posttest) was conducted. There is no
significant main effect for time of measure but there is a significant group x time of
measure interaction (F (1,75) = 5.45, p < .05; partial eta2 = .068, observed power = .635).
The group means show an increase in the treatment group in Moral Stage Attraction over
time, while the control group showed a slight decline (see Table 2 for means). This
shows that although there appears to be no effect of the treatment on the comprehensive
scores of the MTI, subtle changes in moral reasoning may be affected by the treatment as
measured by Moral Stage Attraction.
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Table 2
Group Means of the Between-condition and Within-condition Comparison of Groups for
Moral Stage Attraction.
Group

time

M

SD

3-week treatment

pre

11.65

4.02

post

3.41
pre

13.08

4.02

post

12.66

3.96

pre

12.53

3.60

post

10.62

4.57

pre

13.09

5.08

post

11.28

5.10

14.02

3-week control

9-week treatment

9-week control

In summary, when comparing the control and treatment groups within the 3-week
condition, statistically significant gains in either group are revealed in only one analysis..
The participants in the 3-week condition treatment group gave significantly greater
ratings to statements that reflect higher stages of moral reasoning at posttest than they did
at pretest, compared to the control group.
Within-9-week condition Comparison of Control and Treatment Groups
Although the subjects were randomly assigned to control and treatment
conditions, the 9-week condition sub-sample shows an unequal distribution of age and
reading comprehension between the groups. Among those in the 9-week condition who
completed all the measures (n = 29) a significant difference in both age (t (23) = -2.58, p
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< .05) and reading comprehension (t (23) = 2.37, p < .05) exist between the control and
treatment groups. Among those that completed at least the MTI (N = 29), there is no
significant difference between the control and treatment groups in the 9-week condition
on reading comprehension, but there is a significant difference in age (t (27) = -2.37, p <
.05). However, since the suggested analysis of the MTI includes using reading
comprehension as a covariate, age and reading comprehension will be used as covariates
on all the tests.
The Total Empathy Score, the EC, PT and FS subscales of the IRI and the COS.
These measures were all tested with the same procedure: a two-way ANCOVA with one
between factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (score at pretest and posttest)
with reading comprehension score and age as covariates. In each case, assumptions for
the ANCOVA were met (no significant group x covariate interactions). With all 5
measures, no main effect for time of measure or significant group x time of measure
interaction was found.
MTI Comprehensive Score. To test for differences between the groups on the
outcome of the MTI comprehensive score, a two-way ANCOVA with one between factor
(treatment, control) and one within factor (MTI comprehensive score at pretest and
posttest) was conducted with age and reading comprehension as covariates. The
assumptions for the ANCOVA were met (no significant group x covariate interactions).
A significant main effect for time of measure was demonstrated (F (1,25) = 7.59, p < .05)
with all subjects scoring better on average over time. This was clarified by a significant
age x time of measure interaction effect (F (1,25) = 6.16, p < .05) with older subjects
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doing better over time than younger. However, there was no group x time of measure
interaction.
The Moral Stage Attraction Score. A two-way ANCOVA with one between
factor (treatment, control) and one within factor (the Moral Stage Attraction score at
pretest and posttest) was conducted. There is no significant main effect for time of
measure and there are no significant interactions. See Table 2.
In summary, no treatment effects were demonstrated in the 9-week condition on any of
the measures including the Moral Stage Attraction analysis when comparing the
treatment group to the control.
Post-Hoc Between-Condition Comparisons of Treatment Groups
Since the treatment was implemented differently in the two counties, I had the
opportunity to compare the efficacy of delivering the treatment in a shorter, more intense
manner (over a period of three weeks, three times a week) versus over a longer period
with less frequency per week (a period of nine weeks, once a week). Therefore, the
analysis will proceed with a comparison of the treatment groups between conditions.
IRI total empathy score. The students in the two treatment groups who
completed the full battery differ significantly in age. Therefore, every analysis involving
the IRI, its subscales, and the COS will use age as a covariate. The test of ANCOVA
assumptions showed a significant group (treatment, 3-week condition; treatment, 9-week
condition) x pretest interaction (F (2,45) = 10.99, p < .001); however, no group x age
interaction was observed, meaning the pretest cannot be used as a covariate but age can.
The change in score from pretest to posttest by group was therefore tested with a two-
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way repeated-measures ANCOVA with one between factor (treatment, 3-week condition;
treatment, 9-week condition) and one within factor (total empathy score at pretest and
posttest) with age as covariate. The test revealed no significant main effect for time of
measure or group x time of measure interaction.
IRI Empathic Concern (EC) score. The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a
significant group (treatment, 3-week condition; treatment, 9-week condition) x pretest
interaction (F (2,45) = 10.99, p < .001), but no group x age interaction. A two-way,
repeated-measure ANCOVA with one between factor (treatment, 3-week condition;
treatment, 9-week condition) and one within factor (EC score at pretest and posttest) was
therefore conducted with age as covariate. The results indicate no significant main effect
for time of measure or group x time of measure interaction when controlling for age.
IRI Perspective Taking (PT) score. The test of ANCOVA assumptions indicated
that all had been met. However, in this case a two-way, repeated-measures ANCOVA
with one between factor (treatment, 3-week condition; treatment, 9-week condition) and
one within factor (PT score at pretest and posttest) and age as a covariate was preferred
because using just the one covariate in a mixed design provides more statistical power
than a design with two covariates. Results indicate no main effect for time of measure
but demonstrate a trend toward a significant group x time of measure interaction (F
(1,47) = 3.04, p < .10). The trend is toward a greater gain in PT scores in the 9-week
condition treatment group pretest to posttest compared to the 3-week condition treatment
group (see Table 3 for means).
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Table 3
Mean Pretest and Mean and Adjusted Mean Posttest Scores on Perspective Taking .
Posttest
Pretest

Obtained
SD

M

Adjusted

Condition

n

M

SD

M

3-week treatment

38

13.50 2.89

11.86 3.58

12.57

3-week control

28

13.93 4.77

13.46 3.45

13.81

9-week treatment

12

12.50 4.33

13.58 4.52

12.76

9-week control

13

13.38 4.07

13.61 5.81

13.25

IRI Fantasy Scale (FS) score. The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a
significant group (treatment 3-week condition; treatment 9-week condition) x pretest
interaction (F (2,45) = 3.50, p < .05), but no group x age interaction. A two-way,
repeated-measures ANCOVA with one between factor (treatment, 3-week; treatment, 9week) and one within factor (FS score at pretest and posttest) was therefore conducted
with age as a covariate. The results indicate no significant main effect for time of
measure or group x time of measure interaction when controlling for age.
Concern for Others Scale (COS). The test of ANCOVA assumptions showed a
significant group (treatment, 3-week condition; treatment, 9-week condition) x pretest
interaction (F (2,44) = 11.08, p < .001), but no group x age interaction. A two-way,
repeated-measures ANCOVA with one between factor (treatment, 3-week condition;
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treatment, 9-week condition) and one within factor (score at pretest and posttest) was
therefore conducted with age as covariate. The results indicate no significant main effect
for time of measure or group x time of measure interaction when controlling for age.
MTI Comprehensive Score. Not all students completed the entire battery, but, as
indicated above, all106 study subjects completed the MTI. The treatment groups from the
two counties that completed both the pre- and posttest of the MTI showed no significant
differences in reading comprehension score or age, allowing the consideration of an
ANCOVA analysis without age as a covariate. Given the dependence of the MTI on
reading, Narvaez et al., (1999) suggest that the reading comprehension score as well as
the pretest MTI comprehensive score be used as covariates in the analysis. The test of
ANCOVA assumptions results in a significant group x reading comprehension score
interaction precluding the use of that variable as a covariate (F (2,54) = 3.56, p < .05).
However, there is no group x pre-MTI comprehensive score interaction and the pre-MTI
comprehensive score and the reading comprehension score significantly correlate (r =
.271, p < .05). Therefore, we can get a meaningful analysis by using just the pre-MTI
comprehensive score as a covariate. Thus, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted with the
MTI comprehensive score at posttest as the dependent variable, the pre-MTI
comprehensive score as covariate and the two treatment groups (3-week condition, 9week condition) as fixed factors. Results indicate a significant difference in the group
means in the treatment conditions of the two counties (F(1, 56) = 5.75, p < .05; partial
eta2 = .093; power = .654; R2 = .155). This means that the longer treatment condition
(9-week) had a greater impact than the shorter, more intense treatment (3-week) on the
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posttest comprehensive score of the MTI when controlled for the pretest MTI
comprehensive score. (See Table 4 for means).
Table 4
Mean Pretest and Mean and Adjusted Mean Posttest Scores on the MTI Comprehensive.
Posttest
Pretest

Obtained

Adjusted

Condition

n

M

SD

M

SD

M

3-week treatment

46

6.72

9.99

4.93

9.82

5.14

3-week control

46

2.82

9.95

3.84

10.91

4.93

9-week treatment

13

11.08 15.45

14.00 14.02

13.27

9-week control

13

9.31

19.72 14.66

17.60

15.34

The Moral Stage Attraction Score. Because the focus of the analysis for Moral
Stage Attraction is the change in the rating each individual subject gives to the Stage 1-3
distractor statements from pretest to posttest and the effect that group membership has on
that change, a repeated-measures, two-way ANOVA with one between factor (treatment,
3-week condition; treatment, 9-week condition) and one within factor (the Total Moral
Stage Attraction score at pretest and posttest) was conducted. There is no significant
main effect for time of measure but there is a significant group x time of measure
interaction (F (1,57) = 9.79, p < .01; partial eta2 = .147, observed power = .868). The
group means show an increase in the 3-week condition treatment group in Moral Stage
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Attraction over time, while the 9-week condition treatment group showed a decrease (see
Table 2). This is consistent with expectations, and consistent with the above finding in
which the 9-week condition treatment group made greater gains than the 3-week
condition treatment group on the comprehensive MTI score from pretest to posttest.
Since the Moral Stage Attraction score represents errors in the standard MTI scoring
scheme, the Moral Stage Attraction Score may be inversely related to the MTI score.
In summary, when comparing the 3-week, intense treatment condition with the 9week, extended treatment condition, the longer treatment proved more effective,
especially as measured by the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI) task. Although the test did
not reach significance, there is a trend in the Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI that
favors the longer 9-week condition treatment group as well. When examining the
attraction of the participants to higher stage reasoning from pre- to posttest, by taking a
closer look at the ratings participants gave to Stage 1-3 distractor statements in the MTI,
the opposite trend is found. The 3-week condition treatment group participants gave
significantly higher ratings to Stage 1, 2, and 3 distractor statements at posttest than at
pretest compared to their 9-week condition counterparts.
Summarizing all the results, the within-condition comparisons between treatment
and control groups show no significant effect of the treatment on Moral Theme
Comprehension, Total Empathy, Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking or Fantasy, or on
the measure of Concern for Others in either county. However, the shorter, 3-week
treatment condition initiated an attraction to higher stage moral reasoning statements in
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the treatment group, since the Moral Stage Attraction scores were significantly higher in
that group compared to the control.
The post-hoc between-county comparison of the treatment groups yielded
significant differences in the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI) Comprehensive Score, with
the 9-week condition proving more effective than the shorter 3-week condition. No
significant differences were found in the other measures between treatment groups but
there was a trend in Perspective Taking that favored the 9-week condition treatment
group. An analysis of Moral Stage Attraction score differences revealed that the shorter
3-week treatment condition produced a greater attraction to statements of higher staged
reasoning at posttest than was evident at pretest, compared to the 9-week condition.
Since the Moral Stage Attraction score represents errors in the standard MTI scoring
scheme, we see in both treatment groups an inverse relationship between the Moral Stage
Attraction Score and the MTI score.
Discussion
This study evaluating the effectiveness of the Film Clips for Character Education
curriculum demonstrates that the program has potential for affecting moral reasoning and
perspective taking, but that potential was not realized in this study. Summarizing the
results, the within-condition comparisons of treatment and control groups show no
significant effect of the treatment on Moral Theme Comprehension (MTI), Total
Empathy, Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking, Fantasy (IRI), or on the measure of
Concern for Others (COS) in either county. The only statistically significant difference
in the between group comparisons (treatment vs. control) in either condition was found in
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the Moral Stage Attraction scores in the 3-week condition. The treatment group showed
significantly more attraction to higher stage moral reasoning distractors at posttest than
did the control.
Primary Question for Discussion
The primary question for discussion is: given the theoretical potential of the
curriculum and the support for the techniques found in the literature, why were there no
significant gains in the measures from pre- to posttest in either treatment group compared
to their controls? The discussion will focus on three possible answers: (a) the
implementation of the curriculum was not adequate, (b) the measures did not pick up the
changes the curriculum afforded, and (c) the attrition of the original sample adversely
affected the ability to record significant gains in the treatment group.
Implementation. Of the eight strategies commonly employed in successful
character education programs, four involve teacher training or teaching strategies
(professional development, interactive teaching strategies, direct teaching strategies,
classroom/behavior management; the remaining are: family/community participation,
modeling/mentoring ,school-wide strategies, and community service/service learning,
Berkowitz & Bier, 2005). This finding points to the importance of consistent and
sustained teacher training in the form of professional development and implementation
strategies. The teacher training for the Film Clips curriculum was brief (2 hours) and not
all the teachers received the same training. I trained 5 of the 7 teachers (and one
supervisor) in two separate training sessions. In those sessions the emphasis was
acquainting the teachers with the logistics of the curriculum. Little time was spent on
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training how to lead dilemma discussions or how to get participants to talk to one
another. It was clear from the informal reports of the teachers that the discussion portion
was a form of a teacher-led question and answer session (the students responding to
teacher-initiated questions). Training teachers in more effective discussion techniques
that are proven to develop moral reasoning such as promoting greater student to student
dialogue (Kruger, 1992) and/or a plus-one strategy (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975) would
increase the chances of the curriculum positively affecting the outcome measures.
The difference in the length of treatment between the two counties (3-week vs. 9week) allowed me to test which length of treatment yielded better results. The betweencounty comparison of the treatment groups yielded significant differences in the Moral
Theme Inventory (MTI) comprehensive posttest score, with the 9-week condition proving
more effective than the shorter 3-week condition after controlling for the pretest score
(and, by extension, controlling for reading comprehension, since the pretest MTI score
significantly correlated with reading comprehension). No significant differences were
found in the other measures between treatment groups but there was a trend toward a
difference in the IRI Perspective Taking score that favored the longer 9-week condition
treatment group. A Moral Stage Attraction (MSA) analysis revealed that the shorter 3week treatment condition produced a greater attraction to distractors of higher stages of
reasoning at posttest than was evident at pretest, compared to the 9-week treatment
condition. Since distractors represent wrong answers on the MTI, there is an inverse
relationship between the MSA and the MTI.
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The 9-week condition teachers may have benefited from better training. In the 9week condition, both teachers were trained by the experimenter while only 5 of 7
teachers in the 3-week condition received direct training. The 9-week teachers received
direct instructions from the experimenter on how to conduct the testing as well. The 3week teachers were trained in testing procedures by their supervisor. The testing
procedures were not monitored in either county, so there is no way to know if the tapes
that contained the stories and questions of the MTI were used properly or consistently.
There was also no provision for monitoring the implementation of the curriculum as it
proceeded. Although I obtained some knowledge of the implementation of the
curriculum through a post-hoc interview with some of the teachers, the study would have
benefited from more consistent monitoring of the presentation of the curriculum, the
conduct of the discussion portion and the testing of the participants.
On the positive side, it is sensible to speculate that the gains by the participants in
the longer treatment condition were the result of more time to practice making moral
inferences in their regular school experience, having learned from the Film Clips
curriculum to look for the moral lesson in life situations and to practice good character
traits. However, the practical significance of the finding that the 9-week condition is
more effective than the 3-week condition as measured by the MTI is tempered by the fact
that the effect size of the comparison is minimal (eta2 = .093). It must also be kept in
mind that the 3-week group was from a sample of low-achievers who were required to
attend summer school because they did not pass the test promoting them to the next
grade. In that sense a comparison of the length of program (9-week/3-week) is also a
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comparison of average achievers and low achievers. Again, stressing the positive, the
gains in Moral Stage Attraction by the participants in the 3-week condition compared to
the 3-week control could be the result of intense exposure to higher stage reasoning in the
discussion of the film clips and the dilemmas they present.
Measures. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) has been used
before in program evaluation with late grade school-aged children (Lane-Garon,1998) as
well as the Concern for Others Scale (Solomon et al., 2000). The dearth of results with
these measures are best explained by deficits in the curriculum or in its implementation.
However, this is the first time that the Moral Theme Inventory (Narvaez et al., 1998) has
been used in a pretest-intervention-posttest design. The measure was designed to show
that learning morals and good character from a story was highly dependent on the
reader’s ability to discern moral themes in a story and that this ability was age dependant
(increasing with age, Narvaez et al., 1998). The measure is also highly dependent not
only on reading comprehension skills, but the more sophisticated skill of making correct
inferences from stories. In addition, the ability to catch the moral theme of a story is
tested twice, first by recognizing a similar story with the same moral but different
characters and setting and then by recognizing two correct summary statements of the
story in the midst of five distractor statements. While the curriculum trained the
participants to recognize moral themes in the life situations depicted in the films, those
skills may or may not have translated into better recognition of correct moral themes in
moral stories.
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The testing of gains in moral reasoning are best measured by the ratings and
choices of the restatements of the moral theme of the story. Moreover, as the Moral
Stage Attraction analysis demonstrates, those participants who were attracted to higher
stage reasoning at posttest compared to pretest, yet did not discern the correct restatement
of the moral theme, were actually penalized for a growing attraction to higher stage
statements of the moral of the story (the only restatements of the moral of the story
explicitly based on Kohlberg’s moral reasoning stages are statements that contain
reasoning at stages one through three). Therefore, it can be averred that the MTI
comprehensive score was not sensitive enough to catch these subtle changes in attraction
to higher stages of moral reasoning. In future studies, the use of a measure explicitly
designed to measure changes and growth in moral reasoning may be a better tool in
evaluating the effectiveness of this curriculum than was the MTI.
Attrition. There is little doubt that the findings would have been more conclusive
with a larger sample. The loss of over 75 percent of the original sample at posttest made
the study more complicated and less definitive. The random nature of the sample was
lost which necessitated controlling for age and reading ability and weakening the power
of the statistical testing. Besides the significant differences in age and reading ability
between the two counties, the different lengths of treatment meant that the treatment
groups could not be combined which would have also aided in the statistical analysis.
The gains in a brief intervention would be expected to be small and the numbers of
participants in the 9-week condition are simply too small to detect any small gains in the
measures. The participants in the 3-week condition did show some movement in
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attraction to statements based on higher stages of moral reasoning at posttest, but the
effect size is small (eta2 = .068). The setting of an after-school program is notoriously
difficult for researchers due to these very problems. The after-school population may not
adequately represent the larger population and the after-school programs suffer from
attrition. Testing this curriculum in a more stable classroom setting will certainly benefit
its evaluation.
The one positive and significant result was that the 3-week treatment group
showed attraction to restatements of the moral of the story based on higher stages of
moral reasoning in the MTI at posttest than they had demonstrated at pretest compared to
their control counterparts. This study represents the first time the Moral Stage Attraction
analysis has been conducted with the MTI. It is based on the idea that the participants
might recognizing higher stage statements as a more adequate restatement of the moral
theme of the story at posttest than they had at pretest (as is the case with the 3-week
treatment group compared to their control counterparts). Rest et al. (1999a, 1999b) argue
the validity of recognition as a way of measuring moral stage reasoning. We can
speculate that the attraction to the various distractor statements in the MTI would also
reflect the stage or schema that predominates the subject’s moral reasoning. Tracking the
ratings of the distractors from pre- to posttest gives an indication whether or not the
moral schema out of which the test subject is in the habit of operating has advanced. Rest
et al. (1999b) indicate that transition in moral reasoning in children is not like moving up
the step of a staircase, but more like waves lapping up on the shore as the tide comes in.
Each wave makes more and more progress forward until a higher level is reached. The 3-
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week condition treatment group, by their attraction to higher staged distractor sentences
at posttest compared to pretest, showed progress into higher stages of moral reasoning
(the first “wave,” if you will) without having achieved a consolidation into those higher
stages. Thus one result we might claim from the effect of the curriculum might be that it
initiated an attraction to statements reflecting higher stages of moral reasoning, which
could be the beginning of a change in preference to think about moral decisions at higher
levels of moral reasoning. The 9-week treatment group did not show similar signs as the
3-week treatment group perhaps because the small numbers of participants in that
condition precluded any significant statistical discoveries.
Despite the limitations outlined above, this study contributes to the existing
research on moral development and effective character education on several fronts. It is
the first scientific test of the effectiveness of a new technique for training the critical skill
of perspective taking for moral reasoning and prosocial action using film clips from
Hollywood-produced films. Hollywood films are structured to engage our perceptual
systems as if we were viewing reality (Anderson, 1996) and viewing the film clips allows
for a veridical experience of moral conflict situations. The Film Clips curriculum affords
a chance to teach participants how to reason in moral conflict situations as well as
provides occasion for the discussion of proper moral conduct. Results from a post-hoc
analysis suggest that those exposed to the curriculum over a longer period of time were
more practiced and therefore better able to recognize moral themes and less distracted by
lower level moral reasoning than those who had less exposure to the curriculum (Lapsley
& Narvaez, in press). This study uses the Moral Theme Inventory (Narvaez et al. 1999)
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for the first time to evaluate a program in a pretest – treatment – posttest design.
Moreover, the study employs a new type of analysis of the MTI, the Moral Stage
Attraction, which affords a closer look at the subtle changes in attraction to statements
that reflect higher stages of moral reasoning that is age-appropriate to grade school
children. The participants in the shorter, 3-week condition evidenced an attraction to
higher stage moral reasoning at posttest then they had at pretest.
Because the theoretical potential of the Film Clips curriculum was not realized in
this study does not mean it cannot work well as a vehicle for delivering character
education content and for affecting growth in moral development. The salience of the
emotional experience of viewing a film, coupled with the cognitive processing of those
empathic emotions in group discussion, which mimics the induction technique of parents
when raising moral children, affords a critical opportunity for both the inculcation of
proper character traits and for acquiring the critical skills for a moral disposition. In this
way the goals of traditional character education and rational moral education can be met.
This study shows the potential for such a blended approach to “work” in our
schools and other learning centers. To realize this potential, the implementation of the
curriculum should be more closely monitored. Better training of the teachers, especially
in techniques proven to enhance the development of moral reasoning would enhance the
effectiveness of the curriculum. Conducting the curriculum in a regular classroom setting
where attrition is not as large an issue as in after-school programs along with closely
gauging the ongoing implementation of the curriculum by regular classroom visits and
repeated teacher interviews would allow for a more controlled dose of the treatment and
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afford a stricter analysis of its effectiveness. Finally, testing the curriculum with
measures that can record significant changes in perspective taking, moral reasoning and
prosocial behavior would secure the validity of potential findings.
In conclusion, the theoretical basis of this curriculum is sound. The response of
the teachers who conducted the curriculum and their assessment of the student’s reaction
is wholly positive. Never-the-less, enthusiasm and theoretical potential do not a
successful curriculum make. The most salient conclusion of this study is:
implementation of even the finest curriculum matters. Further research on this
curriculum with proper implementation and controls will contribute to the ongoing
attempts to create effective moral development and character education curricula.
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Figure 2. Changes in MTI scores
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